[16] Captain Philip Patton to Sir Charles Middleton, 27 June 1794. Barham Papers, ii, 393.  Patton had probably wider war experience than any officer then living.  He was regarded as possessing a very special knowledge of personnel, and as vice admiral became second sea lord under Barham in 1804.

Now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, necessarily affected the appreciation of its value.  The weight of the objection tended of course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation improved, but it was always a factor.  It is true also that it seems to have had more weight with some men than with others, but it will appear equally true, if we endeavour to trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was far from being the sole determinant.

It was in the Seven Years’ War under Anson’s administration that continuous and close blockade was first used systematically, but it was Hawke who originated it.  In the first three campaigns the old system of watching Brest from a British western port had been in vogue, but it had twice failed to prevent a French concentration in the vital Canadian theatre.  In the spring of 1759 Hawke was in command of the Channel Fleet with the usual instructions for watching, but being directed to stand over and look into Brest, he intimated his intention, unless he received orders to the contrary, to remain off the port instead of returning to Torbay.  His reason was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was intended for the West Indies, and he considered it better to prevent its sailing than to let it put to sea and try to catch it.  In other words, he argued that none of the usual western watching ports afforded a position interior to the usual French route from Brest to the West Indies.

Since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously the better course to deal with the enemy’s squadrons in home waters and avoid dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out.  In spite of extraordinarily bad weather, therefore, he was permitted to act as he advised.  With Boscawen as relief, the new form of blockade was kept up thenceforward, and with entire success.  But it must be noted that this success was rather due to the fact that the French made no further effort to cross the Atlantic, than to the fact that the blockade was maintained with sufficient strictness to prevent their doing so.  In certain states of weather our fleet was forced to raise the blockade and run to Torbay or Plymouth.  Such temporary reversions to the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the French to get away to the southward with two or three days’ start.  Against any attempt, however, to get to the east or the north in order to dispute command of the Channel or other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and was unaffected by the intervals of the open form.