in the open as an interruption of the enemy’s incomplete mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected the previous year.  For later on he says that “Next under God’s mighty protection the advantage of time and place will be the only and chief means for our good, wherein I most humbly beseech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun, for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them.”  He does not say “destroy.”  “Impeach” meant “to prevent.”

Clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of the previous year’s strategy, whereby he had been able to break up the Spanish mobilisation and “impeach” the Armada from sailing.  He did not even ask for a concentration of the whole fleet for the purpose, but only that his own squadron should be reinforced as was thought convenient.  The actual reasons he gave for his advice were purely moral—­that is, he dwelt on the enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and attacking instead of waiting to be attacked.  The nation, he urged, “will be persuaded that the Lord will put into Her Majesty and her people courage and boldness not to fear invasion, but to seek God’s enemies and Her Majesty’s where they may be found.”

Here is the germ of the maxim.  The consequence of his despatch was a summons to attend the Council.  The conference was followed, not by the half measure, which was all he had ventured to advise in his despatch, but by something that embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and closely resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition in such cases.  The whole of the main fleet, except the squadron watching the Flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover the blockade of Parma’s transports, but the position assigned to it was inside the Channel instead of outside, which tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the Armada the weather gage.  No movement to the coast of Spain was permitted—­not necessarily, be it remembered, out of pusillanimity or failure to grasp Drake’s idea, but for fear that, as in the recent American case, a forward movement was likely to result in a blow in the air, and to uncover the vital position without bringing the enemy to action.

When, however, the sailing of the Armada was so long delayed Drake’s importunity was renewed, with that of Howard and all his colleagues to back it.  It brought eventually the desired permission.  The fleet sailed for Coruna, where it was known the Armada, after an abortive start from Lisbon, had been driven by bad weather, and something like what the Government feared happened.  Before it could reach its destination it met southerly gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had to return to Plymouth impotent for immediate action as the Armada finally sailed.  When the Spaniards appeared it was still in port refitting and victualling.  It was only by an unprecedented feat of seamanship that the situation was saved, and Howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward of his enemy.