The next principle is flexibility.  Concentration should be so arranged that any two parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense into a mass at any point in the area of concentration.  The object of holding back from forming the mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our actual distribution or its intention at any given moment, and at the same time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement that is open to him.  Further than this our aim should be not merely to prevent any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard every detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction.  The ideal concentration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality of strength.

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PART THREE

CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTORY

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I. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE
CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA

Before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles in a definite manner to the conduct of naval war, it is necessary to clear the ground of certain obstacles to right judgment.  The gradual elucidation of the theory of war, it must be remembered, has been almost entirely the work of soldiers, but so admirable is the work they have done, and so philosophical the method they have adopted, that a very natural tendency has arisen to assume that their broad-based conclusions are of universal application.  That the leading lines which they have charted are in a certain sense those which must govern all strategy no one will deny.  They are the real pioneers, and their methods must be in the main our methods, but what we have to remember is that the country we have to travel is radically different from that in which they acquired their skill.

A moment’s consideration will reveal how far-reaching the differences are.  Let us ask ourselves what are the main ideas around which all the military lore turns.  It may be taken broadly that the general principles are three in number.  Firstly, there is the idea of concentration of force, that is, the idea of overthrowing the enemy’s main strength by bringing to bear upon it the utmost accumulation of weight and energy within your means; secondly, there is the idea that strategy is mainly a question of definite lines of communication; and thirdly, there is the idea of concentration of effort, which means keeping a single eye on the force you wish to overthrow without regard to ulterior objects.  Now if we examine the conditions which give these principles so firm a footing on land, we shall find that in all three cases they differ at sea, and differ materially.