line to watch the Texel, and was in no position to deal with the danger.  Accordingly early in May the weight of the home concentration was thrown into the North Sea.  On the 10th Howe sailed with Barrington and the bulk of the fleet to join Ross in the Downs, while Kempenfelt again took the Ushant position.  Only about half the Brest Squadron had gone down to join the Spaniards at Cadiz, and he was told his first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but, as in Barrington’s instructions, if he met a superior squadron he was to retire up Channel under the English coast and join hands with Howe.  In spite of the fact that influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded in holding the French inactive.  Howe with the same difficulty to face was equally successful.  The Dutch had put to sea, but returned immediately they knew of his movement, and cruising off the Texel, he held them there, and kept complete command of the North Sea till our Baltic trade was safe home.

By the end of May it was done, and as our intelligence indicated that the great movement from Cadiz was at last about to begin, Howe, to whom a certain discretion had been left, decided it was time to shift the weight to his other wing and close on Kempenfelt.  The Government, however, seemed to think that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive operations against Dutch trade, but in the admiral’s opinion this was to lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too much to reach.  He informed them that he had not deemed it advisable to make detachments from his squadron against the trade, “not knowing how suddenly there might be a call, for the greater part of it at least, to the westward.”  In accordance, therefore, with his general instructions he left with Ross a strong squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in check, and even “to take and destroy,” the comparatively weak ships of the Dutch, and with the rest returned to the westward.[13] His intention was to proceed with all possible expedition to join Kempenfelt on the coast of France, but this, owing to the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do.  Kempenfelt was forced to come in, and on June 5th the junction was made at Spithead.

  [13] The Dutch were believed to have sixteen of the line—­one
  seventy-four, seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns.  In
  Ross’s squadron were one three-decker and two eighties.

For three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not move.  Then came news that the Cadiz fleet under Langara had sailed the day Howe had reached Spithead, and he resolved to make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea to cut it off from Brest.  He was too late.  Before he could get into position the junction between Langara and the Brest squadron was made, and in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of the Channel.  With the addition of the Brest ships the combined fleet numbered forty of the line, while all Howe could muster was twenty-two, but amongst them were seven three-deckers and three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced.  Three of Ross’s smallest ships were recalled, and five others were nearly ready, but for these Howe could not wait.  The homeward-bound Jamaica convoy was at hand, and at all hazards it must be saved.