a battle-fleet.  It is perfectly true that the control depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile battle-fleet, as it usually is.  It is also true that, so far as is necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force.  But it does not follow that this is the primary function of cruisers.  The truth is, we have to withdraw them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet which it cannot do for itself.

Well established as is the “Eyes of the fleet” maxim, it would be very difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function of cruisers by the highest authorities.  In Nelson’s practice at least their paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with his battle-squadron.  Nothing is more familiar in naval history than his incessant cry from the Mediterranean for more cruisers, but the significance of that cry has become obscured.  It was not that his cruisers were not numerous in proportion to his battleships—­they were usually nearly double in number—­but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare necessity.  The result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy’s battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important.  It was that the escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was charged to maintain.  His judgment may have been at fault, but the strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole period of his Mediterranean command.  Judged by his record, no man ever grasped more clearly than Nelson that the object of naval warfare was to control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and surely this is at least the logical view.  Had the French been ready to risk settling the question of the control in a fleet action, it would have been different.  He would then have been right to sacrifice the exercise of control for the time in order to make sure that the action should take place and end decisively in his favour.  But he knew they were not ready to take such a risk, and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on the part of the enemy to delude him from the special function with which he had been charged.

If the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control.  Logically, therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their being interfered with in their work.  Put it to the test of actual