the assistance of the Baltic Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention.

Whether or not it was on this principle that the Japanese conceived the war from the outset matters little.  The main considerations are that with so favourable a territorial object as Korea limited war was possible in its most formidable shape, that the war did in fact develop on limited lines, and that it was entirely successful.  Without waiting to secure the command of the sea, Japan opened by a surprise seizure of Seoul, and then under cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to complete her occupation of Korea.  As she faced the second stage, that of making good the defence of her conquest, the admirable nature of her geographical object was further displayed.  The theoretical weakness of limited war at this point is the arrest of your offensive action.  But in this case such arrest was neither necessary nor possible, and for these reasons.  To render the conquest secure not only must the Korean frontier be made inviolable, but Korea must be permanently isolated by sea.  This involved the destruction of the Russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the reduction of Port Arthur by military means.  Here, then, in the second stage Japan found herself committed to two lines of operation with two distinct objectives, Port Arthur and the Russian army that was slowly concentrating in Manchuria—­a thoroughly vicious situation.  So fortunate, however, was the geographical conformation of the theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more correct.  By continuing the advance of the Korean army into Manchuria and landing another force between it and the Port Arthur army the three corps could be concentrated and the vicious separation of the lines of operations turned to good account.  They could be combined in such a way as to threaten an enveloping counter-attack on Liao-yang before the Russian offensive concentration could be completed.  Not only was Liao-yang the Russian point of concentration, but it also was a sound position both for defending Korea and covering the siege of Port Arthur.  Once secured, it gave the Japanese all the advantages of defence and forced the Russians to exhaust themselves in offensive operations which were beyond their strength.  Nor was it only ashore that this advantage was gained.  The success of the system, which culminated in the fall of Port Arthur, went further still.  Not only did it make Japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to assume a naval defensive and so to force the final naval decision on Russia with every advantage of time, place, and strength in her own favour.