In the Japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well adapted for the use of limited war.  Owing to the geographical position of Korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from the centre of Russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval action.  Further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which Clausewitz attached the greatest importance—­that is to say, the seizure of the particular object so far from weakening the home defence of Japan would have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position.  Though offensive in effect and intention it was also, like Frederick’s seizure of Saxony, a sound piece of defensive work.  So far from exposing her heart, it served to cover it almost impregnably.  The reason is plain.  Owing to the wide separation of the two Russian arsenals at Port Arthur and Vladivostock, with a defile controlled by Japan interposed, the Russian naval position was very faulty.  The only way of correcting it was for Russia to secure a base in the Straits of Korea, and for this she had been striving by diplomatic means at Seoul for some time.  Strategically the integrity of Korea was for Japan very much what the integrity of the Low Countries was for us, but in the case of the Low Countries, since they were incapable of isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively weak.  Portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at Lisbon, was an analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and since it was capable of being in a measure isolated from the strength of our great rival by naval means we were there almost uniformly successful.  On the whole it must be said that notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of wars waged on a limited basis, in none of them were the conditions so favourable for us as in this case they were for Japan.  In none of them did our main offensive movement so completely secure our home defence.  Canada was as eccentric as possible to our line of home defence, while in the Crimea so completely did our offensive uncover the British Islands, that we had to supplement our movement against the limited object by sending our main fighting fleet to hold the exit of the Baltic against the danger of an unlimited counter-stroke.[8]

[8] The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was certainly to prevent a counter-stroke—­that is, its main function in our war plan was negative.  Its positive function was minor and diversionary only.  It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed.  Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg.  Such an operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited one.  It would have meant the “overthrow of the enemy,” a task quite beyond the strength of the allies without