If, then, the limited form of war has this element of strength over and above the unlimited form, it must be correct to use it when we are not strong enough to use the more exhausting form and when the object is limited; just as much as it is correct to use the defensive when our object is negative and we are too weak for the offensive.  The point is of the highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current doctrine that in war there can be but one legitimate object, the overthrow of the enemy’s means of resistance, and that the primary objective must always be his armed forces.  It raises in fact the whole question as to whether it is not sometimes legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior object of the war.

An impression appears to prevail—­in spite of all that Clausewitz and Jomini had to say on the point—­that the question admits of only one answer.  Von der Goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in asserting that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the object in modern war.  He lays it down as “the first principle of modern warfare,” that “the immediate objective against which all our efforts must be directed is the hostile main army.”  Similarly Prince Kraft has the maxim that “the first aim should be to overcome the enemy’s army.  Everything else, the occupation of the country, &c., only comes in the second line.”

It will be observed that he here admits that the process of occupying the enemy’s territory is an operation distinct from the overthrow of the enemy’s force.  Von der Goltz goes further, and protests against the common error of regarding the annihilation of the enemy’s principal army as synonymous with the complete attainment of the object.  He is careful to assert that the current doctrine only holds good “when the two belligerent states are of approximately the same nature.”  If, then, there are cases in which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an operation distinct from defeating the enemy’s forces, and if in such cases the conditions are such that we can occupy the territory with advantage without first defeating the enemy, it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we should put off till to-morrow what we can do better to-day.  If the occupation of the enemy’s whole territory is involved, or even a substantial part of it, the German principle of course holds good, but all wars are not of that character.

Insistence on the principle of “overthrow,” and even its exaggeration, was of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence to the old and discredited methods.  But its work is done, and blind adherence to it without regard to the principles on which it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere bludgeon play.