History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:—­

    1.  The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

    2.  The protection or destruction of commerce.

    3.  The prevention or securing of alliances (i.e., deterring or
    persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.—­The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance.  Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet.  In the second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

In this way we get a Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the fleet.  For practical purposes it will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of Major Strategy.

These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:—­

    (1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed
    (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).

(2) By getting command of the sea, i.e., establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy’s territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to that of the first—­direct attack.  Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second.  Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely.  Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action against territory before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval Strategy.)

EXAMPLES.—­Rooke’s capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet.  Holmes’s capture of Emden in 1758.

Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the fleet’s duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as possible by battle.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war.  If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.