Where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of operations can be fixed in this way with much precision.  But if, as usually happens, the probable action of the enemy at sea cannot be divined with sufficient approximation, then assuming there is serious possibility of naval interference, the final choice within the limited area must be left to the admiral.  The practice has been to give him instructions which define in order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to select the one which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he considers within reasonable risk of war.  Similarly, if the danger of naval interference be small and the local conditions ashore imperfectly known, the final choice will be with the general, subject only to the practicable possibilities of the landing place he would choose.

During the best period of our old wars there was seldom any difficulty in making things work smoothly on these lines.  After the first inglorious failure at Rochefort in 1757 the practice was, where discretion of this kind had been allowed, for the two commanders-in-chief to make a joint coast-reconnaissance in the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the spot.

It was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations was always arranged thenceforth.  Since the elder Pitt’s time it has never been our practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military exigencies.  The danger of possible friction between two commanders-in-chief came to be regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of the service to which he does not belong.

The system has usually worked well even when questions arose which were essentially questions for a joint superior Staff.  The exceptions indeed are very few.  A fine example of how such difficulties can be settled, when the spirit is willing, occurred in the Crimea.  The naval difficulties, as we have already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of rendering the whole attempt madness.  When it came to the point of execution a joint council of war was held, at which sat the allied Staffs of both services.  So great were the differences of opinion between the French and British Generals, and so imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could not indicate a landing place with any precision.  All the admirals knew was that it must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt communications with the shore, and where they were liable to be attacked by a force which, until their own ships were cleared of troops, would not be inferior.  All these objections they laid before the Council General.  Lord Raglan then said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and was prepared to take it.  Whereupon the allied admirals replied that they were ready to proceed and do their best to set the army ashore and support it at any point that should be chosen.