When in 1795 the expedition under Admiral Christian and General Abercromby was being prepared for the West Indies, the admiral in concert with Jervis drew up a memorandum as to the naval force required.[26] The force he asked for was considerable.  Both he and Jervis considered that the escort and local cover must be very strong, because it was impossible to count on closing either Brest or Toulon effectually by blockade.  But this was not the only reason.  The plan of operations involved three distinct landings, and each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps three, “not only as protection, but as the means by which flat-boats must be manned, cannon landed, and the other necessary services of fatigue executed.”  Christian also required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs “to cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller vessels [that is, the landing flotillas doing inshore work].”  The main attack would require at least four of the line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in proportion.  In all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the frigates being “otherwise employed”] would have to provide landing parties to the number of 2000 men “for the flat-boats, landing and moving guns, water, and provisions,” and this would be their daily task.  The military force these landing parties were to serve amounted to about 18,000 men.

[26] Sir Hugh Cloberry Christian was an officer of high distinction with a remarkable record of battle service.  He had been serving as Howe’s second captain just before his promotion to flag rank in 1795, and died as Commander-in-Chief at the Cape at the early age of fifty-one.

Lord Barham, it must be said, who as Sir Charles Middleton was then First Sea Lord, objected to the requirements as excessive, particularly in the demand for a strong escort, as he considered that the transit could be safeguarded by special vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading squadrons.  The need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored.  His opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first he had taken up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of the expedition.  He regarded the policy which dictated it as radically unsound, and was naturally anxious to restrict the force that was to be spent upon it.  His opposition was based on the broad and far-sighted principles that were characteristic of his strategy.  He believed that in view of the threatening attitude of Spain the right course was to husband the navy so as to bring it up to a two-Power standard for the coming struggle, and to keep it concentrated for decisive naval action the moment Spain showed her hand.  In short, he stoutly condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation of naval force for a secondary object before a working command of the sea had been secured.  It was, in fact, the arrangements for this expedition which forced him to resign before the preparations were complete.  But it is to be observed that his objections to the plan were really due, not to the principle of its organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher consideration of our whole position at sea.[27]