In the conditions that existed nothing was lost.  For the lines of the Japanese fixed defences were so near to the enemy’s base, that by mining the entrance of the port Admiral Togo ensured that the enemy’s exit would be slow enough for him to be certain of getting contact from his defended anchorage before the Russians could get far to sea.  What would happen in a case when no such position could be secured is another matter.  The landing place and supply base of the army must be secured against torpedo attack, and the principle of concentration of effort would suggest that the means of defence should not be attenuated by providing the covering squadron with a defended anchorage elsewhere.  Thus it would appear that unless the geographical conditions permit the covering squadron to use one of its own national bases, the drift of recent developments will be to force it back on the army, and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the transport squadron.  Hence the increased importance of keeping clear the difference in function between the two squadrons.

To emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these two cases may be contrasted with the Lissa episode at the end of the Austro-Italian War of 1866.  In that case it was entirely neglected, with disastrous results.  The Austrian admiral, Tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order been acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in Pola waiting for a chance of a counter-stroke.  Persano with the superior Italian fleet was at Ancona, where he practically dominated the Adriatic.  In July the Italians, owing to the failure of the army, were confronted with the prospect of being forced to make peace on unfavourable terms.  To improve the position Persano was ordered to take possession of the Austrian island of Lissa.  Without any attempt to organise his fleet on the orthodox British principle he proceeded to conduct the operation with his entire force.  Practically the whole of it became involved in amphibious work, and as soon as Persano was thus committed, Tegethoff put to sea and surprised him.  Persano was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to meet the attack, and having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, he was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy.  According to British practice, it was clearly a case where, if the operation were to be undertaken at all, an independent covering squadron should have been told off either to hold Tegethoff in Pola or to bring him to timely action, according to whether the island or the Austrian fleet was the primary objective.  The reason it was not done may be that Persano was not given a proper landing force, and he seems to have considered that the whole strength of his fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the objective.  If so, it is only one more proof of the rule that no matter what fleet support the landing operations may require, it should never be given in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the possibility of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval action.