From a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which calls first for consideration, because of the emphasis with which its necessity marks not only the distinction between the conduct of combined expeditions and the conduct of commercial convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions are actually a combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet.

In our system of commerce protection the covering squadron had no place.  The battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed in holding definite terminal areas, and had no organic connection with the convoys.  The convoys had no further protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that met them as they approached the terminal areas.  But where a convoy of transports forming part of a combined expedition was destined for an enemy’s country and would have to overcome resistance by true combined operations, a covering battle-squadron was always provided.  In the case of distant objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not attached till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of operations; during transit to that theatre the transports might have commerce protection escort only.  But once the operations began from the point of concentration, a covering squadron was always in touch.

It was only where the destination of the troops was a friendly country, and the line of passage was well protected by our permanent blockades, that a covering squadron could be dispensed with altogether.  Thus our various expeditions for the assistance of Portugal were treated exactly like commercial convoys, but in such cases as Wolfe’s expedition to Quebec or Amherst’s to Louisburg, or indeed any of those which were continually launched against the West Indies, a battle-squadron was always provided as an integral part in the theatre of operations.  Our arrangements in the Crimean War illustrate the point exactly.  Our troops were sent out at first to land at Gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that territory as an army of observation.  It was not a true combined expedition, and the transports were given no covering squadron.  Their passage was sufficiently covered by our Channel and Mediterranean fleets occupying the exits of the Baltic and the Black Sea.  But so soon as the original war plan proved ineffective and combined offensive operations against Sebastopol were decided on, the Mediterranean fleet lost its independent character, and thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering squadron in touch with the troops.

Seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, the term “Covering squadron” may seem ill-chosen to describe it.  But it is adopted for two reasons.  In the first place, it was the one employed officially in our service on the last mentioned occasion which was our last great combined expedition.  In preparing the descent on the Crimea, Sir Edmund Lyons, who was acting as Chief of the Staff to Sir James Dundas, and had charge