The deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from such a position was well known to our old tradition.  The device was used several times, particularly in our home waters, to prevent a fleet, which for the time we were locally too weak to destroy, from carrying out the work assigned to it.  A typical position of the kind was off Scilly, and it was proved again and again that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything in the Channel till the fleet off Scilly had been brought to decisive action.  But the essence of the device was the preservation of the aggressive spirit in its most daring form.  For success it depended on at least the will to seize every occasion for bold and harassing counter-attacks such as Drake and his colleagues struck at the Armada.

To submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a superior enemy’s fleet is another form of defensive, but one that is almost wholly evil.  For a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations elsewhere which otherwise would be impossible.  But if prolonged, it will sooner or later destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of effective aggression.

The conclusion then is that although for the practical purpose of framing or appreciating plans of war the classification of wars into offensive and defensive is of little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative advantages of offence and defence is essential.  We must realise that in certain cases, provided always we preserve the aggressive spirit, the defensive will enable an inferior force to achieve points when the offensive would probably lead to its destruction.  But the elements of strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal rapid blows in the enemy’s unguarded moments.  So soon as the defensive ceases to be regarded as a means of fostering power to strike and of reducing the enemy’s power of attack it loses all its strength.  It ceases to be even a suspended activity, and anything that is not activity is not war.

With these general indications of the relative advantages of offence and defence we may leave the subject for the present.  It is possible of course to catalogue the advantages and disadvantages of each form, but any such bald statement—­without concrete examples to explain the meaning—­must always appear controversial and is apt to mislead.  It is better to reserve their fuller consideration till we come to deal with strategical operations and are able to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its various forms.  Leaving therefore our first classification of wars into offensive and defensive we will pass on to the second, which is the only one of real practical importance.

* * * * *

CHAPTER THREE

Natures of wars—­
limited and unlimited

* * * * *