[23] Supra, p. 222.

Here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the real key of the solution—­the power, that is, of forcing the mass of the enemy’s fleet to escort the transports.  Hardy, of course, knew it well from his experience of 1744, and acted accordingly.  This case is the more striking, since defence against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the problem he had to solve.  It was complicated by instructions that he must also prevent a possible descent on Ireland, and cover the arrival of the great convoys.  In reply, on August 1st, he announced his intention of taking station ten to twenty leagues W.S.W. of Scilly, “which I am of opinion,” he said, “is the most proper station for the security of the trade expected from the East and West Indies, and for the meeting of the fleets of the enemy should they attempt to come into the Channel.”  He underlined the last words, indicating, apparently, his belief that they would not venture to do so so long as he could keep his fleet to the westward and undefeated.  This at least he did, till a month later he found it necessary to come in for supplies.  Then, still avoiding the enemy, he ran not to Plymouth, but right up to St. Helen’s.  The movement is always regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much dissatisfaction in the fleet at the time.  But it is to be observed that his conduct was strictly in accordance with the principle which makes the invading army the primary objective.  If Hardy’s fleet was no longer fit to keep the sea without replenishment, then the proper place to seek replenishment was on the invader’s line of passage.  So long as he was there, invasion could not take place till he was defeated.  The allies, it was true, were now free to join their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave the admiral no uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance of serving his enemy as the Spaniards were served in 1588.  “I shall do my utmost,” he said, “to drive them up the Channel.”  It is the old principle.  If the worst comes to the worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet upon the transports, and especially in narrow waters, invasion becomes an operation beyond the endurable risks of war.

So it proved.  On August 14th Count d’Orvilliers, the allied commander-in-chief, had made the Lizard, and for a fortnight had striven to bring Hardy to decisive action.  Until he had done so he dared neither enter the Channel with his fleet nor detach a squadron to break the cruiser blockades at the invasion bases.  His ineffectual efforts exhausted his fleet’s endurance, which the distant concentration at Finisterre had already severely sapped, and he was forced to return impotent to Brest before anything had been accomplished.  The allies were not able to take the sea again that campaign, but even had it been in their power to do so, Hardy and Kempenfelt could have played their defensive game indefinitely, and with ever-increasing chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a paralysing blow.