In the next project, that of 1759, a new and very clever plan was devised for turning the difficulty.  The first idea of Marshal Belleisle, like that of Napoleon, was to gather the army at Ambleteuse and Boulogne, and to avoid the assemblage of transports by passing it across the Strait by stealth in flat boats.  But this idea was abandoned before it had gone very far for something much more subtle.  The fallacious advantage of a short passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three widely separated points all in more open waters—­a diversionary raid from Dunkirk and two more formidable forces from Havre and the Morbihan in South Brittany.  To secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on the Brest fleet from the Mediterranean and the West Indies.

The new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering fleet—­that is, the Western Squadron off Brest—­would have two cruiser blockades to secure, one on either side of it.  Difficult as the situation looked, it was solved on the old lines.  The two divisions of the French army at Dunkirk and Morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following them over the open sea if by chance they escaped, while the third division at Havre, which had nothing but flat boats for transport, was held by a flotilla well supported.  Its case was hopeless.  It could not move without a squadron to release it, and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from Brest.  Hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, but he could scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that attempted to enter the Channel.  With the Morbihan force it was different.  Any time that Hawke was blown off a squadron could reach it from Brest and break the cruiser blockade.  The French Government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to make the attempt.  Conflans however, who was in command, protested his force was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the intended concentration.  Boscawen had caught and beaten the Mediterranean squadron off Lagos, and though the West Indian squadron got in, it proved, as in Napoleon’s great plan of concentration, unfit for further service.  The old situation had arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end there was nothing for it but for Conflans to take his whole fleet to the Morbihan transports.  Hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous day of Quiberon was the result.  The Dunkirk division alone got free, but the smallness of its size, which permitted it to evade the watch, also prevented its doing any harm.  Its escort, after landing its handful of troops in Ireland, was entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the French to invade over an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the loss of their fleet.