The Brest squadron had an equally narrow escape.  Saxe and his staff having heard rumours of Norris’s movement to the Downs had become seized with the sea-sickness which always seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the dangers of an uncommanded passage.  They too wanted the whole fleet to escort them, and orders had been sent to Roquefeuille to do as he had suggested.  All unconscious of Norris’s presence in the Downs with a score of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the fifteen he had still with his flag to close on Barraille.  Norris was informed of his approach, and it was now he wrote his admirable appreciation, already quoted, for dealing with the situation.

“As I think it,” he said, “of the greatest consequence to his Majesty’s service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country, I have ... determined to anchor without the sands of Dunkirk, where we shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in.”  That is, he determined to keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy’s fleet, and as Saxe’s objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close blockade.  “But if,” he continued, “they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night and go northward [that is, for Scotland], I intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of my squadron either fight the French fleet now in the Channel, or observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or I shall pursue the embarkation [that is, follow the transports] with all my strength.”  This meant he would treat the enemy’s army offensively and their fleet defensively, and his plan was entirely approved by the King.

As to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference is that his choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, for it was reported the Rochefort squadron had joined Roquefeuille.  The doubt was quickly settled.  On the morrow he heard that Roquefeuille was at Dungeness with only fifteen of the line.  In a moment he seized all the advantage of the interior position which Roquefeuille’s necessity to close on the army had given him.  With admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his whole force at the enemy’s fleet without losing his hold on the army’s line of passage.  The movement was made immediately.  The moment the French were sighted “General chase” was signalled, and Roquefeuille was within an ace of being surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the attack.  The calm was succeeded by another furious gale, in which the French escaped in a disastrous sauve qui peut, and the fleet of transports was destroyed.  The outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, but that we secured the command of home waters for the rest of the war.

The whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had exhibited the normal course of degradation.  For all the nicely framed plan and the perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy’s battle-fleet with his transports, and we on our part were able to forestall it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of a central mass on a revealed and certain line of passage.