Some Principles of Maritime Strategy eBook

Julian Corbett
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 354 pages of information about Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy eBook

Julian Corbett
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 354 pages of information about Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.
was ordered to hoist his flag at Spithead.  His instructions were “to take the most effectual measures to prevent the making of any descent upon the kingdoms.”  It was nothing but news that the young Pretender had left Rome for France that led to this precaution.  The Government had still no suspicion of what was brewing at Dunkirk.  It was not till the 20th that a Dover smuggler brought over information which at last opened their eyes.

A day or two later the French transports were seen making for Dunkirk, and were mistaken for the Brest fleet.  Orders were consequently sent down to Norris to follow them.  In vain he protested at the interference.  He knew the French were still to the westward of him, but his orders were repeated, and he had to go.  Tiding it up-Channel against easterly winds, he reached the Downs and joined the Nore Division there on the 28th.  History usually speaks of this false movement as the happy chance which saved the country from invasion.  But it was not so.  Saxe had determined not to face the Thames ships without escort.  They were ample to destroy him had he done so.  In truth the move which the Government forced on Norris spoilt the campaign and prevented his destroying the Brest fleet as well as stopping the invasion.

Roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the Start.  He was instructed by all possible means to bring the main British fleet to action, or at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also to detach the special division of four of the line under Admiral Barraille to Dunkirk to escort the transports.  It was in fact the inevitable order, caused by our hold on the army, to divide the fleet.  Both officers as usual began to be upset, and as with Medina-Sidonia, they decided to keep company till they reached the Isle of Wight and remain there till they could get touch with Saxe and pilots for the Dover Strait.  They were beset with the nervousness that seems inseparable from this form of operation.  Roquefeuil explained to his Government that it was impossible to tell what ships the enemy had passed to the Downs, and that Barraille when he arrived off Dunkirk might well find himself in inferiority.  He ended in the usual way by urging that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of passage.  On arriving off Portsmouth, however, a reconnaissance in thick weather led him to believe that the whole of Norris’s fleet was still there, and he therefore detached Barraille, who reached Dunkirk in safety.

Not knowing that Norris was in the Downs, Saxe began immediately to embark his troops, but bad weather delayed the operation for three days, and so saved the expedition, exposed as it was in the open roads, from destruction by an attack which Norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla of fireships and bomb vessels.

Copyrights
Project Gutenberg
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.