[20] Delarbre, Tourville et la marine de son temps, p. 339. (Author’s
  note.)

In Torrington’s and Tourville’s time, when ships were unhandy and fleet tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of avoiding action, when a determined enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a port of retreat was kept open.  But as the art of naval warfare developed, the possibilities of “a fleet in being” were regarded as much wider, at least in the British service.  It was nearly a hundred years before we were again forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it was believed that superior speed and tactical precision were factors that could be counted on to an almost unlimited extent.  In the darkest days of the War of American Independence we have a memorandum of the subject by Kempenfelt, which not only gives the developed idea of “a fleet in being” and the high aggressive spirit that is its essence, but also explains its value, not merely as a defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic offensive even when you are as a whole inferior.  “When you know the enemy’s designs,” he says, “in order to do something effectual you must endeavour to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and where, if they succeed, they would most injure you.  If your fleet is divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts.  If a squadron cannot be formed sufficient to face the enemy’s at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere.”

“When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to watch and attend upon their motions, such a squadron should be composed of two-decked ships only [that is, ships of the highest mobility] as to assure it purpose.  It must have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to give up some of its heavy sailers.  It is highly necessary to have such a flying squadron to hang on the enemy’s large fleet, as it will prevent their dividing into separate squadrons for intercepting your trade or spreading their ships for a more extensive view.  You will be at hand to profit from any accidental separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales, fogs, or other causes.  You may intercept supplies, intelligence, &c, sent to them.  In fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their motions, and prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise do.”

Three years before, when first called to be Chief of the Staff in the Channel, he had emphasised the same points.  “Much,” he wrote in July 1779, “I may say all, depends upon this fleet.  ’Tis an inferior against a superior fleet.  Therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at some or other feeble part of the enemy’s line; or if such opportunities don’t offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your attack."[21]