Under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified by the words of Torrington’s despatch, he procured from the Queen an order in these terms:  “We apprehend,” it ran, “the consequences of your retiring to the Gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the wind give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy.”  It was, however, left to his discretion to proceed to the westward to complete his concentration that way, provided, it said, “you by no means ever lose sight of the French fleet whereby they may have opportunity of making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of Medway or Thames, or get away without fighting.”

This order has been very hardly dealt with by modern critics, although it clearly contemplates true preventive observation, and even, as the last words suggest, the idea contained in Nelson’s well-known saying, “that by the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm this year.”  It is true that Nelson could rely on the proved superiority of the British at that time unit for unit, but it is also true that Nottingham and his colleagues in the Government had information which led them greatly to underestimate Tourville’s strength.  This was evident on the face of Nottingham’s despatch which covered the order, so evident indeed that Torrington might well perhaps have suspended the execution of an order so obviously based on incorrect information.  But knowing probably what intrigues were going on against him at Court, he chose to regard it as a peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to windward.

Much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire Torrington’s conception, there seems no reason for losing temper over the Government’s plan.  It was certainly one way of solving the problem, and seeing how large were our reserves, a defeat need not have meant disaster.  Still, it was doubtless dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of Torrington’s novel plan, a plan which was not only safer, but was calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end.  The real fallacy of the Government’s plan was that although it had a specious appearance of a bold offensive, it could have achieved nothing but a negative result.  The most a battle could have given in the circumstances could only have left the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy a positive result, which must have gravely compromised William’s campaign in Ireland.

On these lines Torrington replied to the Government.  Dealing with their anxiety for the ships to the westward and the Mediterranean convoy, whose danger was their expressed reason for forbidding him the Gunfleet, he pointed out that they could not run much hazard if they took care of themselves.  For, as he repeated, “while we observe the French, they cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy.”  Thus without specially noticing the Minister’s misinterpretation of his despatch, he intimated that his intention was observation, and not simple retreat.