he would have a good chance of repelling an attack with success.  There, too, he counted on being reinforced not only by the ships still at Chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which might steal along the coast and join him “over the flats” by channels unknown to the French.  To fight as he was he considered to be only playing the enemy’s game.  “If we are beaten,” he said in communicating his plan to the Government, “they being absolute masters of the sea will be at great liberty of doing many things which they dare not do whilst we observe them and are in a possibility of joining Admiral Killigrew and our ships to the westward.”

It was a plan conceived on the best principles of defence—­waiting till the acquisition of fresh force justified a return to the offensive.  It is further interesting as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior object other than control of home waters.  In the minds of the Government there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade across the Channel, but the invasion of Ireland was in full progress, and all nourishment of it must be stopped and our own communications kept free.  There was, moreover, serious anxiety lest the French should extend their operations to Scotland, and there was Killigrew’s homeward-bound convoy approaching.  The situation was one that obviously could not be solved effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but in Torrington’s judgment it could be rendered innocuous by holding the command in dispute.  His design, therefore, was to act upon the defensive and prevent the enemy achieving any positive result until he was in a position to fight them with a fair chance of victory.  A temporary defensive he considered was the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision in inferior strength was the best way to lose it.

Nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of good strategy as we understand them now.  It was undoubtedly in advance of anything that had been done up to that time, and it was little wonder if the Government, as is usually said, failed to appreciate the design.  Their rejection of it has come in for very severe criticism.  But it would seem that they misunderstood rather than failed to appreciate.  The Earl of Nottingham, who was at the head of the Government, believed, as his reply to the admiral clearly shows, that Torrington meant to retire to the Gunfleet at once; whereas it is equally clear to us that the Gunfleet was to be his extreme point, and that he did not mean to retire so far unless the French forced him.  The Minister failed, as others have done since, to grasp what the admiral meant by “A fleet in being.”  He thought that in Torrington’s view a fleet safe in port and not in contact with the enemy was “in being,” whereas Torrington had no such idea.  As Nottingham conceived the admiral’s intention he saw that although it might preserve the fleet, it would expose everything else to destruction; that is, he was oppressed with the special characteristic of naval warfare which always permits action against the ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of acting against his armed force.