Some Principles of Maritime Strategy eBook

Julian Corbett
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 354 pages of information about Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

Some Principles of Maritime Strategy eBook

Julian Corbett
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 354 pages of information about Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.

The occasion on which it was first used was one that well exhibits the special possibilities of a naval defensive.  It was in the year 1690, when, in alliance with the Dutch, we were at war with France, and though really superior, had been caught in a situation which placed us temporarily at a great disadvantage in home waters.  The French by a surprising rapidity of mobilisation and concentration had stolen a march on us before either our mobilisation or our concentration was complete.  King William, with the best of the army, was in Ireland dealing with a French invasion in support of James, and a squadron of seven sail under Sir Cloudesley Shovel had been detached into the Irish Sea to guard his communications.  Another squadron, consisting of sixteen of the line, British and Dutch, had been sent to Gibraltar under Admiral Killigrew to take down the trade and to keep an eye on Chateaurenault, who with a slightly inferior squadron was at Toulon.  It was assumed he would probably make a push for Brest, where the French main fleet was mobilising under the Comte de Tourville, and Killigrew had orders to follow him if he got through the Straits.  Chateaurenault did get through; Killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of following him immediately, he went into Cadiz to complete his arrangements for forwarding his outward-bound convoy and escorting the one he was to bring home.  What of course he should have done, according to the practice of more experienced times, was to have left this work to a cruiser detachment, and failing contact with Chateaurenault, should have closed at once to the strategical centre with his battle-squadron.

Meanwhile the home fleet, which Lord Torrington was to command, was still unformed.  It lay in three divisions, at the Downs, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, while a considerable part of the promised Dutch contingent had not made its appearance.  It was a splendid chance for the French to seize the command of the Channel before the concentration could take place and to crush the British in detail.  Accordingly, on June 13th, as soon as Chateaurenault had arrived, Tourville put to sea with some seventy of the line.  The day before, however, Torrington, having hoisted his flag in the Downs, had massed his two main divisions at Portsmouth, and by the time Tourville appeared off the Isle of Wight he had with later arrivals, both Dutch and British, about fifty-six of the line in St. Helen’s Road.  Not knowing that the Toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea intending to fight, but on discovering the great superiority of the French, he decided in concert with his council of war to act on the defensive, and before offering battle to endeavour to secure a concentration with Killigrew and Shovel and the Plymouth division by getting to the westward.  If he found this course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to retire before Tourville “even to the Gunfleet,” where amidst the shoals of the Thames estuary he felt

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Some Principles of Maritime Strategy from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.