Melville was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable strain.  “Allow me to remind you,” he added, “that the occasions when we have been able to bring our enemy to battle and our fleets to victory have generally been when we were at a distance from the blockading station.”  In the end, as we know, Cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of history has been to approve the decision for its moral effect alone.  Such conflicts must always arise.  “War,” as Wolfe said, “is an option of difficulties,” and the choice must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances tend to develop the respective advantages of each form.  We can never say that close blockade is better than open, or the reverse.  It must always be a matter of judgment.

  [19] For Barham’s final views, 1805, see Barham Papers, iii, 90-93.

Are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the old practice for the strengthening of judgment?  Certain broad lines of guidance at least are to be traced.  The main question will be, is it to our advantage, in regard to all the strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him to sea for a decision?  Presumably it will always be our policy to get a decision as soon as possible.  Still that desire may be overridden by the necessity or special advantage of closely blockading one or more of his squadrons.  This situation may arise in two ways.  Firstly, it may be essential to provide for the local and temporary command of a certain theatre of operations, as when an invasion threatens in that area, or when we wish to pass a military expedition across it, or from special exigencies in regard to the attack or defence of commerce.  Secondly, even where we are seeking a great decision, we may blockade one squadron closely in order to induce a decision at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to say, we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the enemy to attempt with one or more other squadrons to break that blockade.  In this way we may lead him either to expose himself to be struck in detail, or to concentrate where we desire his concentration.

For any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of realising our object is to use close blockade, but the matter does not end there.  We have still to consider whether close blockade is within the limit of the force we have available, and whether it is the best method of developing the fullest potentialities of that force.  Close blockade being the more exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot blockade closely for any length of time without a force relatively superior; but if by open blockade of a squadron we permit it to put to sea with contact assured, we know that, even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal with it as to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our trade.