territory.  Why, then, did he not employ close blockade?  It is usually assumed that it was because of his overpowering desire to bring the Toulon squadron to action.  Occasional expressions in his letters give colour to such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire to bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific subordination to the defensive duty with which he was charged.  Close blockade was the most effectual means of securing this end, but in his case one of the conditions, which we have found always accompanying successful close blockade, was absent.  He had no such preponderance of force as would enable him to nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity.  In the circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him to use with the force at his disposal.

If this case be not considered conclusive as to Nelson’s views, we have a perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in 1801.  It is a particularly strong testimony, for he was at the time actually charged with defence against the invasion of England.  With several cruiser squadrons he had to prevent the enemy’s force issuing from a number of ports extending from Flushing to Dieppe, and he was directing the operations from the Downs.  On the approach of winter he was impressed with the inexpediency of attempting to continue a close blockade, and wrote to the Admiralty as follows:  “I am of opinion, and submit to their Lordships’ better judgment, that care should be taken to keep our squadrons compact and in good order ... under Dungeness to be their principal station....  In fine weather our squadrons to go out and show themselves, but never to risk either being crippled or drawn into the North Sea; thus we shall always be sure of an effective force, ready to act as occasion calls for it."[18]

  [18] To Evan Nepean, 4 September 1801.  Nicolas, Nelson Despatches, iv,
  484.

The case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns the question of direct resistance to invasion and not to securing general command.  Its value is that it gives Nelson’s views on the broad question of balancing the risks—­that is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too rigorously.

With Nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find that as late as 1804 naval opinion was not quite settled on the relative advantages of close and open blockade even in the case of threatened invasion.  Just a year before Trafalgar was fought, Cornwallis pressed the Admiralty for more strength to enable him to keep his blockade efficient.  Lord Melville, who at this time had Barham at his elbow, replied recommending the “policy of relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly resorted to.”  He protested the means available were insufficient for “sustaining the necessary extent of naval force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of winter."[19]