lack of spirit or love of ease.  So far as the summer was concerned there was really little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should be kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more than compensated for the exhaustion of material likely to be caused by intermittent spells of bad weather.  Even for the winter the two policies came to much the same thing.  Thus in Hawke’s blockade at the end of 1759, during the critical month from mid-October to mid-November, he was unable to keep his station for nearly half the time, and when he did get contact with Conflans it was from Torbay and not Ushant.  Still it may be doubted if without the confidence bred of his stormy vigil the battle of Quiberon would have been fought as it was.

With all this experience fresh in his mind Kempenfelt frankly advocated keeping the fleet in port for the winter.  “Suppose,” he wrote from Torbay in November 1779, “the enemy should put to sea with their fleet (that is, from Brest)—­a thing much to be wished for by us—­let us act wisely and keep ours in port.  Leave them to the mercy of long nights and hard gales.  They will do more in favour of you than your fleet can.”  Far better he thought to devote the winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign so as to have “the advantage of being the first in the field.”  “Let us,” he concluded, “keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to attend the motions of the enemy.  I don’t mean to keep them at sea, disabling themselves in buffeting the winds, but at Torbay ready to act as intelligence may suggest."[17] It will be seen, therefore, that the conclusion that close blockade was always the best means of rendering the fleet most efficient for the function it had to perform must not be accepted too hastily.  The reasons which induced Howe and Kempenfelt to prefer open blockade were mainly based on this very consideration.  Having in mind the whole of the surrounding conditions, in their highly experienced opinion careful preparation in the winter and tactical evolutions in the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the force available.

  [17] Barham Papers, i, 302.

On the other hand, we have the fact that during the War of American Independence the open system was not very successful.  But before condemning it out of hand, it must be remembered that the causes of failure were not all inherent in the system.  In the first place, the need of relieving Gibraltar from time to time prevented the Western Squadron devoting itself entirely to its watch.  In the next place, owing to defective administration the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to preparing the fleet to be first in the field in the spring.  Finally, we have to recognise that the lack of success was due not so much to permitting the French to cross the Atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them when contact was obtained at their destination.  Obviously there is nothing to be said for the policy of “seeking out” as against that of preventing exit unless you are determined when you find to destroy or to be destroyed.  It was here that Rodney and his fellows were found wanting.  The system failed from defective execution quite as much as from defective design.