of apprehension.  But since the wisdom of our Ancestors have thought this Provision sufficient for our security, What has his present Majesty deserv’d from his Subjects, that he should be made a Minor at no less than fifty years of age? or that his House of Commons should Fetter him beyond any of his Predecessors? where the Interest goes, you will say, there goes the power.  But the most ingenious of your Authors, I mean Plato Redivivus, broaches no such principle as that you should force this Prerogative from the King, by undue courses.  The best use which can be made of all, is rather to support the Monarchy, than to have it fall upon your Heads.  If indeed there were any reasonable fear of an Arbitrary Government, the adverse Party had somewhat to alledge in their defence of not supplying it; but it is not only evident, that the Kings temper is wholly averse from any such Design, but also demonstrable, that if all his Council, were such as this man most falsely suggests them to be, yet the notion of an absolute power in the Prince is wholly impracticable, not only in this Age, but for ought any wise man can foresee, at any time hereafter.  ’Tis plain, that the King has reduc’d himself already to live more like a private Gentleman than a Prince; and since he can content himself in that condition, ’tis as plain, that the supplies which he demands are only for the service of the publick, and not for his own maintenance.  Monsieur de Sully might give what Council he thought convenient for Henry the Fourth, who was then designing that Arbitrary power, which his Successors have since compass’d, to the ruine of the Subjects liberty in France; but I appeal to the Consciences of those men, who are most averse to the present Government, if they think our King would put his Peace and Quiet at this time of day, upon so desperate an issue.  What the necessities, which they are driving him into, may make him part with on the other hand, I know not.  But how can they answer it to our Posterity, that for private Picques, self Interest, and causeless jealousies, they would destroy the foundation of so excellent a Government, which is the admiration and envy of all Europe?

The rest of my Authors Paragraph, is only laying more load upon the Ministers, and telling us, that if a sum of Money sufficient for those ends were given, while they were Managers of Affairs, it would be only to set them free from any apprehensions of account to any future Parliament.  But this Argument having only the imaginary fear of an Arbitrary power for its foundation, is already answer’d, he adds in the close of it, That the Prince has a cheap bargain, who gives Paper-Laws in exchange of Money and Power.  Bargains, he tells us, there have always been, and always will be, betwixt Prince and People, because it is in the Constitution of our Goverment, and the chief dependance of our Kings is in the love and liberality of their People.