what appears to be light to one eye, appears light
to another; that what seems sweet to one palate, is
sweet to another; that what is dark and bitter to this
man, is likewise dark and bitter to that; and we conclude
in the same manner of great and little, hard and soft,
hot and cold, rough and smooth; and indeed of all
the natural qualities and affections of bodies.
If we suffer ourselves to imagine, that their senses
present to different men different images of things,
this sceptical proceeding will make every sort of
reasoning on every subject vain and frivolous, even
that sceptical reasoning itself which had persuaded
us to entertain a doubt concerning the agreement of
our perceptions. But as there will be little
doubt that bodies present similar images to the whole
species, it must necessarily be allowed, that the
pleasures and the pains which every object excites
in one man, it must raise in all mankind, whilst it
operates naturally, simply, and by its proper powers
only: for if we deny this, we must imagine that
the same cause, operating in the same manner, and
on subjects of the same kind, will produce different
effects; which would be highly absurd. Let us
first consider this point in the sense of taste, and
the rather as the faculty in question has taken its
name from that sense. All men are agreed to call
vinegar sour, honey sweet, and aloes bitter; and as
they are all agreed in finding those qualities in
those objects, they do not in the least differ concerning
their effects with regard to pleasure and pain.
They all concur in calling sweetness pleasant, and
sourness and bitterness unpleasant. Here there
is no diversity in their sentiments; and that there
is not, appears fully from the consent of all men in
the metaphors which are taken, from the souse of taste.
A sour temper, bitter expressions, bitter curses,
a bitter fate, are terms well and strongly understood
by all. And we are altogether as well understood
when we say, a sweet disposition, a sweet person,
a sweet condition and the like. It is confessed,
that custom and some other causes have made many deviations
from the natural pleasures or pains which belong to
these several tastes; but then the power of distinguishing
between the natural and the acquired relish remains
to the very last. A man frequently comes to prefer
the taste of tobacco to that of sugar, and the flavor
of vinegar to that of milk; but this makes no confusion
in tastes, whilst he is sensible that the tobacco
and vinegar are not sweet, and whilst he knows that
habit alone has reconciled his palate to these alien
pleasures. Even with such a person we may speak,
and with sufficient precision, concerning tastes.
But should any man be found who declares, that to
him tobacco has a taste like sugar, and that he cannot
distinguish between milk and vinegar; or that tobacco
and vinegar are sweet, milk bitter, and sugar sour;
we immediately conclude that the organs of this man
are out of order, and that his palate is utterly vitiated.