In this case, therefore, it was not the man that was to be punished, nor his faults that were to be discountenanced.  Opposition to acts of power was to be marked by a kind of civil proscription.  The popularity which should arise from such an opposition was to be shown unable to protect it.  The qualities by which court is made to the people, were to render every fault inexpiable, and every error irretrievable.  The qualities by which court is made to power, were to cover and to sanctify everything.  He that will have a sure and honorable seat in the House of Commons must take care how he adventures to cultivate popular qualities; otherwise he may remember the old maxim, Breves et infaustos populi Romani amores.  If, therefore, a pursuit of popularity expose a man to greater dangers than a disposition to servility, the principle which is the life and soul of popular elections will perish out of the constitution.

It behoves the people of England to consider how the House of Commons, under the operation of these examples, must of necessity be constituted.  On the side of the court will be, all honors, offices, emoluments; every sort of personal gratification to avarice or vanity; and, what is of more moment to most gentlemen, the means of growing, by innumerable petty services to individuals, into a spreading interest in their country.  On the other hand, let us suppose a person unconnected with the court, and in opposition to its system.  For his own person, no office, or emolument, or title; no promotion, ecclesiastical, or civil, or military, or naval, for children, or brothers, or kindred.  In vain an expiring interest in a borough calls for offices, or small livings, for the children of mayors, and aldermen, and capital burgesses.  His court rival has them all.  He can do an infinite number of acts of generosity and kindness, and even of public spirit.  He can procure indemnity from quarters.  He can procure advantages in trade.  He can get pardons for offences.  He can obtain a thousand favors, and avert a thousand evils.  He may, while he betrays every valuable interest of the kingdom, be a benefactor, a patron, a father, a guardian angel to his borough.  The unfortunate independent member has nothing to offer, but harsh refusal, or pitiful excuse, or despondent representation of a hopeless interest.  Except from his private fortune, in which he may be equalled, perhaps exceeded, by his court competitor, he has no way of showing any one good quality, or of making a single friend.  In the House, he votes forever in a dispirited minority.  If he speaks, the doors are locked.  A body of loquacious placemen go out to tell the world that all he aims at is to get into office.  If he has not the talent of elocution, which is the case of many as wise and knowing men as any in the House, he is liable to all these inconveniences, without the eclat which attends upon any tolerably successful exertion of eloquence.  Can we conceive a more discouraging