The instinct which carries the people towards the choice of the former, is justified by reason; because a man of such a character, even in its exorbitances, does not directly contradict the purposes of a trust, the end of which is a control on power.  The latter character, even when it is not in its extreme, will execute this trust but very imperfectly; and, if deviating to the least excess, will certainly frustrate instead of forwarding the purposes of a control on government.  But when the House of Commons was to be new modelled, this principle was not only to be changed but reversed.  Whilst any errors committed in support of power were left to the law, with every advantage of favorable construction, of mitigation, and finally of pardon; all excesses on the side of liberty, or in pursuit of popular favor, or in defence of popular rights and privileges, were not only to be punished by the rigor of the known law, but by a discretionary proceeding, which brought on the loss of the popular object itself.  Popularity was to be rendered, if not directly penal, at least highly dangerous.  The favor of the people might lead even to a disqualification of representing them.  Their odium might become, strained through the medium of two or three constructions, the means of sitting as the trustee of all that was dear to them.  This is punishing the offence in the offending part.  Until this time, the opinion of the people, through the power of an assembly, still in some sort popular, led to the greatest honors and emoluments in the gift of the crown.  Now the principle is reversed; and the favor of the court is the only sure way of obtaining and holding those honors which ought to be in the disposal of the people.

It signifies very little how this matter may be quibbled away.  Example, the only argument of effect in civil life, demonstrates the truth of my proposition.  Nothing can alter my opinion concerting the pernicious tendency of this example, until I see some man for his indiscretion in the support of power, for his violent and intemperate servility, rendered incapable of sitting in Parliament.  For as it now stands, the fault of overstraining popular qualities, and, irregularly if you please, asserting popular privileges, has led to disqualification; the opposite fault never has produced the slightest punishment.  Resistance to power has shut the door of the House of Commons to one man; obsequiousness and servility, to none.

Not that I would encourage popular disorder, or any disorder.  But I would leave such offences to the law, to be punished in measure and proportion.  The laws of this country are for the most part constituted, and wisely so, for the general ends of government, rather than for the preservation of our particular liberties.  Whatever therefore is done in support of liberty, by persons not in public trust, or not acting merely in that trust, is liable to be more or less out of the ordinary course of the law; and