shake him off, and to disclaim the whole of his proceedings.  Of this nature was that astonishing transaction, in which Lord Rochford, our ambassador at Paris, remonstrated against the attempt upon Corsica, in consequence of a direct authority from Lord Shelburne.  This remonstrance the French minister treated with the contempt that was natural:  as he was assured, from the ambassador of his court to ours, that these orders of Lord Shelburne were not supported by the rest of the (I had like to have said British) administration.  Lord Rochford, a man of spirit, could not endure this situation.  The consequences were, however, curious.  He returns from Paris, and comes home full of anger.  Lord Shelburne, who gave the orders, is obliged to give up the seals.  Lord Rochford, who obeyed these orders, receives them.  He goes, however, into another department of the same office, that he might not be obliged officially to acquiesce, in one situation, under what he had officially remonstrated against, in another.  At Paris, the Duke of Choiseul considered this office arrangement as a compliment to him:  here it was spoken of as an attention to the delicacy of Lord Rochford.  But whether the compliment was to one or both, to this nation it was the same.  By this transaction the condition of our court lay exposed in all its nakedness.  Our office correspondence has lost all pretence to authenticity:  British policy is brought into derision in those nations, that a while ago trembled at the power of our arms, whilst they looked up with confidence to the equity, firmness, and candor, which shone in all our negotiations.  I represent this matter exactly in the light in which it has been universally received.

Such has been the aspect of our foreign politics, under the influence of a double cabinet.  With such an arrangement at court, it is impossible it should have been otherwise.  Nor is it possible that this scheme should have a better effect upon the government of our dependencies, the first, the dearest, and most delicate objects, of the interior policy of this empire.  The colonies know, that administration is separated from the court, divided within itself, and detested by the nation.  The double cabinet has, in both the parts of it, shown the most malignant dispositions towards them, without being able to do them the smallest mischief.

They are convinced, by sufficient experience, that no plan, either of lenity, or rigor, can be pursued with uniformity and perseverance.  Therefore they turn their eyes entirely from Great Britain, where they have neither dependence on friendship, nor apprehension from enmity.  They look to themselves, and their own arrangements.  They grow every day into alienation from this country; and whilst they are becoming disconnected with our government, we have not the consolation to find, that they are even friendly in their new independence.  Nothing can equal the futility, the weakness, the rashness, the timidity, the perpetual contradiction in the management of our affairs in that part of the world.  A volume might be written on this melancholy subject; but it were better to leave it entirely to the reflections of the reader himself, than not to treat it in the extent it deserves.