one another, or in any sort to throw the dependence of public counsels upon private will and favor, possibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of Bute.  It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that particular person.  But let him be who or what he will, he abets a faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his country.  He is sapping the foundation of its liberty, disturbing the sources of its domestic tranquillity, weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading it from all its importance in the system of Europe.

It is this unnatural infusion of a system of favoritism into a government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, that has raised the present ferment in the nation.  The people, without entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects, in much violence, in a great spirit of innovation, and a general disorder in all the functions of government.  I keep my eye solely on this system; if I speak of those measures which have arisen from it, it will be so far only as they illustrate the general scheme.  This is the fountain of all those bitter waters of which, through an hundred different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burst.  The discretionary power of the crown in the formation of ministry, abused by bad or weak men, has given rise to a system, which, without directly violating the letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the whole constitution.

A plan of favoritism for our executory government is essentially at variance with the plan of our legislature.  One great end undoubtedly of a mixed government like ours, composed of monarchy, and of controls, on the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the prince shall not be able to violate the laws.  This is useful indeed and fundamental.  But this, even at first view, is no more than a negative advantage; an armor merely defensive.  It is therefore next in order, and equal in importance, that the discretionary powers which are necessarily vested in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon public principles and national grounds, and, not on the likings or prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court.  This, I said, is equal in importance to the securing a government according to law.  The laws reach but a very little way.  Constitute government how you please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of ministers of state.  Even all the use and potency of the laws depends upon them.  Without them, your commonwealth is no better than a scheme upon paper; and not a living, active, effective constitution.  It is possible that through negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully conducted, ministers may suffer one part of government to languish, another