It must be remembered, that since the revolution, until the period we are speaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in supporting the ministers of state, and in carrying on the public business according to their opinions.  But the party now in question is formed upon a very different idea.  It is to intercept the favor, protection, and confidence of the crown in the passage to its ministers; it is to come between them and their importance in Parliament; it is to separate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies; it is intended as the control, not the support, of administration.  The machinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, and false in its principle.  It is formed on a supposition that the king is something external to his government; and that he may be honored and aggrandized, even by its debility and disgrace.  The plan proceeds expressly on the idea of enfeebling the regular executory power.  It proceeds on the idea of weakening the state in order to strengthen the court.  The scheme depending entirely on distrust, on disconnection, on mutability by principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member; it is impossible that the total result should be substantial strength of any kind.

As a foundation of their scheme, the cabal have established a sort of rota in the court.  All sorts of parties, by this means, have been brought into administration; from whence few have had the good fortune to escape without disgrace; none at all without considerable losses.  In the beginning of each arrangement no professions of confidence and support are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage.  But while the ministers of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, while they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and every sail filled with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favor, in a short time they find, they know not how, a current, which sets directly against them:  which prevents all progress; and even drives them backwards.  They grow ashamed and mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power, only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance.  They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to see themselves opposed by the natural instruments of their office.  With the loss of their dignity they lose their temper.  In their turn they grow troublesome to that cabal which, whether it supports or opposes, equally disgraces and equally betrays them.  It is soon found necessary to get rid of the heads of administration; but it is of the heads only.  As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best connections, it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office without their leaders.  By this means the party goes out much thinner than it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary possession of power.  Besides, if by accident, or in course of changes, that power should be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment of these carcasses, which may serve to cover themselves in a day of danger.  They conclude, not unwisely, that such rotten members will become the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient connections.