The first part of the reformed plan was to draw a line which should separate the court from the ministry.  Hitherto these names had been looked upon as synonymous; but for the future, court and administration were to be considered as things totally distinct.  By this operation, two systems of administration were to be formed; one which should be in the real secret and confidence; the other merely ostensible to perform the official and executory duties of government.  The latter were alone to be responsible; whilst the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were effectually removed from all the danger.

Secondly, A party under these leaders was to be formed in favor of the court against the ministry:  this party was to have a large share in the emoluments of government, and to hold it totally separate from, and independent of, ostensible administration.

The third point, and that on which the success of the whole scheme ultimately depended, was to bring Parliament to an acquiescence in this project.  Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, connections, and character of the ministers of the crown.  By means of a discipline, on which I shall say more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to the most opposite interests, and the most discordant politics.  All connections and dependencies among subjects were to be entirely dissolved.  As, hitherto, business had gone through the hands of leaders of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and to engage their confidence; now the method was to be altered:  and the lead was to be given to men of no sort of consideration or credit in the country.  This want of natural importance was to be their very title to delegated power.  Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an insensibility to pride as well as to duty.  Those high and haughty sentiments, which are the great support of independence, were to be let down gradually.  Points of honor and precedence were no more to be regarded in Parliamentary decorum than in a Turkish army.  It was to be avowed, as a constitutional maxim, that the king might appoint one of his footmen, or one of your footmen for minister; and that he ought to be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or wisdom in the nation.  Thus Parliament was to look on as if perfectly unconcerned, while a cabal of the closet and back-stairs was substituted in the place of a national administration.

With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any court might well be deemed thoroughly secure.  The capital objects, and by much the most flattering characteristics of arbitrary power, would be obtained.  Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the personal favor and inclination of the prince.  This favor would be the sole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be held; so that no person looking towards another, and all looking towards the court, it was impossible but that the motive which solely influenced every man’s hopes must come in time to govern every man’s conduct; till at last the servility became universal, in spite of the dead letter of any laws or institutions whatsoever.