of tumult and disorder, our law has invested every
man, in some sort, with the authority of a magistrate.
When the affairs of the nation are distracted, private
people are, by the spirit of that law, justified in
stepping a little out of their ordinary sphere.
They enjoy a privilege, of somewhat more dignity and
effect, than that of idle lamentation over the calamities
of their country. They may look into them narrowly;
they may reason upon them liberally; and if they should
be so fortunate as to discover the true source of
the mischief, and to suggest any probable method of
removing it, though they may displease the rulers for
the day, they are certainly of service to the cause
of government. Government is deeply interested
in everything which, even through the medium of some
temporary uneasiness, may tend finally to compose the
minds of the subject, and to conciliate their affections.
I have nothing to do here with the abstract value
of the voice of the people. But as long as reputation,
the most precious possession of every individual, and
as long as opinion, the great support of the state,
depend entirely upon that voice, it can never be considered
as a thing of little consequence either to individuals
or to governments. Nations are not primarily ruled
by laws: less by violence. Whatever original
energy may be supposed either in force or regulation,
the operation of both is, in truth, merely instrumental.
Nations are governed by the same methods, and on the
same principles, by which an individual without authority
is often able to govern those who are his equals or
his superiors; by a knowledge of their temper, and
by a judicious management of it; I mean,—when
public affairs are steadily and quietly conducted;
not when government is nothing but a continued scuffle
between the magistrate and the multitude; in which
sometimes the one and sometimes the other is uppermost;
in which they alternately yield and prevail, in a series
of contemptible victories, and scandalous submissions.
The temper of the people amongst whom he presides
ought therefore to be the first study of a statesman.
And the knowledge of this temper it is by no means
impossible for him to attain, if he has not an interest
in being ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.
To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present possessors of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant hopes of the future, are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind; indeed the necessary effects of the ignorance and levity of the vulgar. Such complaints and humors have existed in all times; yet as all times have not been alike, true political sagacity manifests itself in distinguishing that complaint which only characterizes the general infirmity of human nature, from those which are symptoms of the particular distemperature of our own air and season.