then be ready to throw ourselves,—­in a sort of precipitate trust, some strange disposition of the mind jumbled up of presumption and despair,—­into the hands of the most pretending and forward undertaker.  One such undertaker at least he has in readiness for our service.  But let me assure this generous person, that however he may succeed in exciting our fears for the public danger, he will find it hard indeed to engage us to place any confidence in the system he proposes for our security.

His undertaking is great.  The purpose of this pamphlet, at which it aims directly or obliquely in every page, is to persuade the public of three or four of the most difficult points in the world,—­that all the advantages of the late war were on the part of the Bourbon alliance; that the peace of Paris perfectly consulted the dignity and interest of this country; and that the American Stamp Act was a masterpiece of policy and finance; that the only good minister this nation has enjoyed since his Majesty’s accession, is the Earl of Bute; and the only good managers of revenue we have seen are Lord Despenser and Mr. George Grenville; and, under the description of men of virtue and ability, he holds them out to us as the only persons fit to put our affairs in order.  Let not the reader mistake me:  he does not actually name these persons; but having highly applauded their conduct in all its parts, and heavily censured every other set of men in the kingdom, he then recommends us to his men of virtue and ability.

Such is the author’s scheme.  Whether it will answer his purpose I know not.  But surely that purpose ought to be a wonderfully good one, to warrant the methods he has taken to compass it.  If the facts and reasonings in this piece are admitted, it is all over with us.  The continuance of our tranquillity depends upon the compassion of our rivals.  Unable to secure to ourselves the advantages of peace, we are at the same time utterly unfit for war.  It is impossible, if this state of things be credited abroad, that we can have any alliance; all nations will fly from so dangerous a connection, lest, instead of being partakers of our strength, they should only become sharers in our ruin.  If it is believed at home, all that firmness of mind, and dignified national courage, which used to be the great support of this isle against the powers of the world, must melt away, and fail within us.

In such a state of things can it be amiss if I aim at holding out some comfort to the nation; another sort of comfort, indeed, than that which this writer provides for it; a comfort not from its physician, but from its constitution:  if I attempt to show that all the arguments upon which he founds the decay of that constitution, and the necessity of that physician, are vain and frivolous?  I will follow the author closely in his own long career, through the war, the peace, the finances, our trade, and our foreign politics:  not for the sake of the particular measures which