UGLINESS.

It may perhaps appear like a sort of repetition of what we have before said, to insist here upon the nature of ugliness; as I imagine it to be in all respects the opposite to those qualities which we have laid down for the constituents of beauty.  But though ugliness be the opposite to beauty, it is not the opposite to proportion and fitness.  For it is possible that a thing may be very ugly with any proportions, and with a perfect fitness to any uses.  Ugliness I imagine likewise to be consistent enough with an idea of the sublime.  But I would by no means insinuate that ugliness of itself is a sublime idea, unless united with such qualities as excite a strong terror.

SECTION XXII.

GRACE.

Gracefulness is an idea not very different from beauty; it consists in much the same things.  Gracefulness is an idea belonging to posture and motion.  In both these, to be graceful, it is requisite that there be no appearance of difficulty; there is required a small inflection of the body; and a composure of the parts in such a manner, as not to incumber each other, not to appear divided by sharp and sudden angles.  In this case, this roundness, this delicacy of attitude and motion, it is that all the magic of grace consists, and what is called its je ne scai quoi; as will be obvious to any observer, who considers attentively the Venus de Medicis, the Antinous or any statue generally allowed to be graceful in a high degree.

SECTION XXIII.

ELEGANCE AND SPECIOUSNESS.

When any body is composed of parts smooth and polished, without pressing upon each other, without showing any ruggedness or confusion, and at the same time affecting some regular shape, I call it elegant.  It is closely allied to the beautiful, differing from it only in this regularity; which, however, as it makes a very material difference in the affection produced, may very well constitute another species.  Under this head I rank those delicate and regular works of art, that imitate no determinate object in nature, as elegant buildings, and pieces of furniture.  When any object partakes of the above-mentioned qualities, or of those of beautiful bodies, and is withal of great dimensions, it is full as remote from the idea of mere beauty; I call fine or specious.

SECTION XXIV.

THE BEAUTIFUL IN FEELING.

The foregoing description of beauty, so far as it is taken in by the eye, may he greatly illustrated by describing the nature of objects, which produce a similar effect through the touch.  This I call the beautiful in feeling.  It corresponds wonderfully with what causes the same species of pleasure to the sight.  There is a chain in all our sensations; they are all but different sorts of feelings calculated