This is exemplified in the case before us.  Sufficient evidence was given of Christ’s innocence.  The judge was convinced, and knew that it was his duty to treat him as innocent.  But if to answer worldly ends, or in any respect to gratify depravity, he preferred crucifying the guiltless, he had power to do it.  Though Jesus was the Son of God, God had left him in the hands of the enemy.  “It was their hour and the power of darkness.”  They chose and conspired his death.  The Jews would not receive such a Messias.  Pilate did not choose to offend the Jews.  The former urged his crucifixion, for fear “all men would believe on him.”  The latter was prevailed with to condemn the guiltless, because he wished to gratify the chiefs of the nation which he governed.  Both sinned against the light of their own minds, not of necessity, but out of choice—­knowingly did wrong to gain worldly ends; or avoid temporal disadvantages.

Sinners commonly act on the same principles.  They can distinguish between good an evil—­can “judge of themselves what is right.”  They know it to be their duty to choose the good, and refuse the evil.  But possessing power to counteract the dictates of conscience, often to gain worldly ends, and answer sinister views, do counteract them —­choose that for which they are condemned of themselves.

It is folly to pretend that our choices are necessary.  The proposition involves absurdity.  Choice and necessity are often opposites.

Some bewildered in the labyrinth of metaphysics have doubted the plainest truths—­the existence of matter!  And even their own existence!  But these doubts are a species of madness.  To the person of common sense they are unnecessary.  Let him only believe his senses, which the author of nature hath given to instruct him, and they will all vanish.

In the case before us, a single glance inward, carries full conviction that we are free.  To offer arguments in proof is superfluous—­is trifling—­it is to ape the philosopher who attempted to syllogize himself into a conviction of his own existence! *

* Cogito, ergo sum.  Descartes.

From the knowledge of our capacity, and liberty of choice, ariseth sense of merit and demerit.  And thence our expectation of reward or punishment from an enlightened and righteous tribunal.  Were we necessitated to actions, now, the most criminal, we should have no sense of guilt; neither should we fear condemnation from a just judge on their account.  Did we choose such actions, if we knew our choices to be the effect of invincible, supernal influence, they would give us no concern.  On our part, no criminality would be attached to them; it would rest with the efficient.  Had Pilate been compelled to give sentence against Christ, he would have had no sense of guilt; nor could he have been justly criminated.  But when the motives which actuated him, and his freedom of choice are considered, he must have been condemned of himself, and of all mankind.