carry out their undertakings, some powerful state—­Germany, or Russia, or Japan—­could not be trusted, and that this want of confidence would oblige all nations to maintain large armaments with all their attendant risks and burdens.  To obviate this difficulty, it is proposed by some that the signatories shall pledge themselves to take joint action, diplomatic, economic, or forcible, against any of their members who, in defiance of the treaty obligations, makes or proposes an armed attack upon another member.  This is the measure of stiffening added by Mr. Lowes Dickinson in his constructive pamphlet After the War:  ’The Powers entering into the arrangement’ are to ’pledge themselves to assist, if necessary, by their national forces, any member of the League who should be attacked before the dispute provoking the attack has been submitted to arbitration or conciliation.’  A state, however, by Mr. Dickinson’s scheme, is still to remain at liberty to refuse an award, and after the prescribed period, even to make war for the enforcement of its demands.  Other peace-leaguers go somewhat further, assigning to the league an obligation to use economic or forcible pressure for securing the acceptance of the award of the Court of Arbitration, though leaving the acceptance of the recommendations of the Conciliation Court to the free option of the parties.  This is the proposal made by Mr. Raymond Unwin, and by the League of Peace.

Now a definite halt at this position is intelligible and defensible.  While binding by strict sanctions the States to submit all disputes to the pacific machinery that is provided, to await the conclusion of the arbitral and conciliatory processes, and even to accept the legal awards of arbitration, it leaves a complete formal freedom to refuse the recommendations of the Commission of Conciliation.  Yet it must be borne in mind that most of the really dangerous disputes, involving likelihood of war, are not arbitrable in their nature, and will come before the Commission of Conciliation.  If no provision is made for enforcing the acceptance of the recommendations of this body, what measure of real security for peace has been attained?  An incendiary torch, like that kindled last year in the Balkans, may once again put Europe in flames.  The defenders of the position we are now considering have three replies.  They admit that their proposal still leaves open the possibility of war, but they contend that if a sufficient cooling-off time or ‘moratorium’ is secured, the likelihood of an ultimate recourse to war by rejection of the award will be reduced to a minimum.  They urge that no scheme which can be devised will preclude the possibility of a strong criminal or reckless State violating its treaty obligations and seeking to enforce its will by force.  Finally they urge that many self-respecting States would refuse to abandon the ultimate right of declaring war, in cases where they deemed their vital interests were affected, and that any invitation to take this step might wreck the possibility of a less complete but very valuable arrangement.