rather than differences, in the attachment to antiquity or novelty, in the partiality to minute or comprehensive investigations.”  “The Idols of the Market-Place” have reference to the tendency to confound words with things, which has ever marked controversialists in their learned disputatious.  In what he here says about the necessity for accurate definitions, he reminds us of Socrates rather than a modern scientist; this necessity for accuracy applies to metaphysics as much as it does to physics.  “The Idols of the Theatre” have reference to perverse laws of demonstration which are the strongholds of error.  This school deals in speculations and experiments confined to a narrow compass, like those of the alchemists,—­too imperfect to elicit the light which should guide.

Bacon having completed his discussion of the Idola, then proceeds, to point out the weakness of the old philosophies, which produced leaves rather than fruit, and were stationary in their character.  Here he would seem to lean towards utilitarianism, were it not that he is as severe on men of experiment as on men of dogma.  “The men of experiment are,” says he, “like ants,—­they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance.  But the bee takes a middle course; it gathers the material from the flowers, but digests it by a power of its own. . . .  So true philosophy neither chiefly relies on the powers of the mind, nor takes the matter which it gathers and lays it up in the memory, whole as it finds it, but lays it up in the understanding, to be transformed and digested.”  Here he simply points out the laws by which true knowledge is to be attained.  He does not extol physical science alone, though doubtless he had a preference for it over metaphysical inquiries.  He was an Englishman, and the English mind is objective rather than subjective, and is prone to over-value the outward and the seen, above the inward and unseen; and perhaps for the same reason that the Old Testament seems to make prosperity the greatest blessing, while adversity seems to be the blessing of the New Testament.

One of Bacon’s longest works is the “Silva Sylvarum,”—­a sort of natural history, in which he treats of the various forces and productions of Nature,—­the air the sea, the winds, the clouds, plants and animals, fire and water, sounds and discords, colors and smells, heat and cold, disease and health; but which varied subjects he presents to communicate knowledge, with no especial utilitarian end.

“The Advancement of Learning” is one of Bacon’s most famous productions, but I fail to see in it an objective purpose to enable men to become powerful or rich or comfortable; it is rather an abstract treatise, as dry to most people as legal disquisitions, and with no more reference to rising in the world than “Blackstone’s Commentaries” or “Coke upon Littleton.”  It is a profound dissertation on the excellence of learning; its great divisions treating of history, poetry, and philosophy,—­of metaphysical as well as physical philosophy; of the province of understanding, the memory, the will, the reason, and the imagination; and of man in society,—­of government, of universal justice, of the fountains of law, of revealed religion.