Partly to oppose this low opinion of poetry, the neo-Aristotelians among the critics began to stress the view that fable, design, and structure were the really essential elements in poetry, and that these were the product of reason, or judgment.  And because reason was the means by which truth was discovered, poetry by virtue of its rational framework became capable of revealing and communicating truth—­that is, of instructing.  In this conception of poetry there was little glory left for wit.  It was relegated to be used for color and adornment in serious poetry, or to furnish the substance of the “little” poetry which could not boast of design or structure.  Thus, the Essay on Wit invites the poet, (p. 15): 

Have as much Wit as you will, or you can, in a Madrigal, in little light Verses, in the Scene of a Comedy, which is neither passionate or simple, in a Compliment, in a little Story, in a Letter where you would be merry yourself to make your Friends so.

Be witty in these playful varieties of poetry, because wit in a large and serious work would be insufferable.

“These Sports of the Imagination, these Finesses, these Conceits, these glittering Strokes, these Gaieties, these little cut Sentences, these ingenious Prodigalities” in which wit is expressed might be either sober or funny.  Most of the examples in the Essay on Wit are of the sober kind, coming under the order of wit because they are pretty and diverting fancies.  But by the 1690’s there had been a clear tendency to associate wit with mirth, and often with satire.  By 1726 James Arbuckle could write (A Collection of Letters, 1729, II, 72):  “...  Satire and Ridicule, which are the main Provocatives to Laughter, still keep their ground among us, and are reckoned the chief Embellishments of Discourse by all who aim at the Character of Wits.”

The end of wit was to surprise and delight.  One may surprise by novelty, but the easiest road to the goal is audacity; and the subjects which lent themselves most readily to audacity were sex and religion.  The treatment of the latter proved especially troublesome to good men like Blackmore, and the frequency of portraits and characters of the Profance Wit shows that many people were disturbed.  Shaftesbury in Sensus Communis (1709) tried to justify the use of wit in discussing religion.  For the rest of the century Shaftesbury’s position was the center of heated debate, with Akenside supporting, and John Brown and Warburton opposing, the employment of wit in religion; and the Gentleman’s Magazine is full of the arguments of lesser men who took sides.  The author of the Essay on Wit places himself firmly beside Shaftesbury when he remarks (p. 14) that “a Subject which will not bear Raillery, is suspicious.”  The controversy is reviewed in an article by A.O.  Aldridge, called “Shaftesbury and the Test of Truth” (PMLA, LX, 129-156).