In general it was recognized that there were two main kinds of wit.  Both fancy and judgment, said Hobbes (Human Nature, X, sect. 4), are usually understood in the term wit; and wit seems to be “a tenuity and agility of spirits,” opposed to the sluggishness of spirits assumed to be characteristic of dull people.  Sometimes wit was used in this sense to translate the words ingenium or l’esprit.  But Hobbes’s disciple Walter Charleton objected to making it the equivalent of ingenium, which, he said, rather signified a man’s natural inclination—­that is, genius.  Instead, he described wit as either the faculty of understanding, or an act or effect of that faculty; and understanding is made up of both judgment and Imagination.  The Ample or Happy Wit exhibits a fine blend of the two (Brief Discourse concerning the Different Wits of Men, 1669, pp. 10, 17-19).  In this sense wit combines quickness and solidity of mind.

In the other, and more restricted sense, wit was made identical with fancy (or imagination) and distinguished sharply from reason or judgment.  So Hobbes, recording a popular meaning of wit, remarked (Leviathan.  I, viii) that people who discover rarely observed similitudes in objects that otherwise are much unlike, are said to have a good wit.  And judgment, directly opposed to it, was taken to be the faculty of discerning differences in objects that are superficially alike. (Between this idea of wit as discovering likeness in things unlike, and the Platonic idea of discovering the One in the Many, the Augustans made no connection.) A similar distinction between wit and judgment was made by Charleton, Robert Boyle, John Locke, and many others.  The full implication lying in Hobbes’s definition can be seen in Walter Charleton, who said (Brief Discourse, pp. 20-21) that imagination (or wit) is the faculty by which “we conceive some certain similitude in objects really unlike, and pleasantly confound them in discourse:  Which by its unexpected Fineness and allusion, surprizing the Hearer, renders him less curious of the truth of what is said.”  In short, wit is delightful, but, because it leads away from truth, unprofitable and, it may be, even dangerous.

The identification of wit with fancy gave it a lowly role in Augustan thinking; and also in literary prose, which was supposed to be the language of reason (cf.  Donald F. Bond, “‘Distrust’ of Imagination in English Neo-Classicism,” PQ, XIV, 54-69).  What of its position in poetry?  According to Hobbes, poetry must exhibit both judgment and fancy, but fancy should dominate; and the work of fancy is to adorn discourse with tropes and figures, to please by extravagance, to disguise meaning, and to create pleasant illusions.  One of Hobbes’s followers announced that fancy must have the upper hand because all poems please chiefly by novelty.  While they made wit the most essential element in poetry, they made it trivial and empty, and thereby helped to bring poetry itself into contempt.