of any sincere religious belief at all.  Farnese, meanwhile, whose genius for Machiavellian statesmanship was as remarkable as those gifts for leadership in war which entitled him to rank as the first general of his time, was a man who never failed to take full advantage of the mistakes and weaknesses of his opponents.  At the head of a veteran force he laid siege in the spring of 1579 to the important frontier town of Maestricht.  He encountered a desperate resistance, worthy of the defence of Haarlem or of Leyden, and for four months the garrison held out grimly in the hope of relief.  But, despite all the efforts of Orange to despatch an adequate force to raise the siege, at last (June 29) the town was carried by assault and delivered up for three days to the fury of a savage soldiery.  By the possession of this key to the Meuse, Parma was now able to cut off communications between Brabant and Protestant Germany.  Had he indeed been adequately supported by Philip it is probable that at this time all the provinces up to the borders of Holland might have been brought into subjection by the Spanish forces.

The position of William was beset with perils on every side.  One by one his adherents were deserting him; even in the provinces of Holland and Zeeland he was losing ground.  He saw clearly that without foreign help the national cause for which he had sacrificed everything was doomed.  In this emergency he reopened negotiations with Anjou, not because he had any trust in the French prince’s capacity or sincerity, but for the simple reason that there was no one else to whom he could turn.  As heir to the throne of France and at this time the favoured suitor of Queen Elizabeth, his acceptance of the sovereignty of the Netherlands would secure, so Orange calculated, the support both of France and England.  It was his hope also that the limiting conditions attached to the offer of sovereignty would enable him to exercise a strong personal control over a man of weak character like Anjou.  The Duke’s vanity and ambition were flattered by the proposal; and on September 19, 1580, a provisional treaty was signed at Plessis-les-Tours by which Anjou accepted the offer that was made to him, and showed himself quite ready to agree to any limitations imposed upon his authority, since he had not any intention, when once he held the reins of power, of observing them.

The first effect of William’s negotiations with Anjou was to alienate the Calvinists without gaining over the Catholics.  Anjou was suspect to both.  The action of the Spanish government, however, at this critical juncture did much to restore the credit of the prince with all to whom the Spanish tyranny and the memory of Alva were abhorrent.  Cardinal Granvelle, after fifteen years of semi-exile in Italy, had lately been summoned to Madrid to become chief adviser to the king.  Granvelle spared no pains to impress upon Philip the necessity of getting rid of Orange as the chief obstacle to the pacification of the Netherlands,