England, Muenster and Cologne, and in detaching from the Dutch the Emperor and the Swedes.  The finances under Colbert were in a flourishing state, and a splendid army had been equipped by the great war minister, Louvois.  It was in vain that Pieter de Groot sent warnings of coming peril.  The council-pensionary was deaf, and the States-General still deafer.  Temple had left (August, 1670) for a visit to London, and he never returned.  For some months there was no resident English ambassador at the Hague.  Finally, at the end of the year, Downing arrived, the very man who had done his utmost to bring about the war of 1665.  De Witt still placed his hopes in the anti-French views of the English Parliament; but in August, 1671, it was dissolved by the king and was not summoned to meet again for a year and a half.  Charles had therefore a free-hand, and the secret treaty of Dover was the result.  The reports of De Groot became more and more alarming; and De Witt found it necessary to urge the States to make preparations both by sea and land to resist attack.  But he met with a luke-warm response.  The fleet indeed was considerably strengthened, but the army was in a miserable state.  At no time during the English wars had a powerful army been required, and the lesson taught by the invasion of the Bishop of Muenster had had little effect.  The heavy charges of the naval war compelled the States and especially Holland, on whom the chief burden fell, to economise by cutting down the military expenses.  Politically also the ruling burgher-regents in Holland had from past experience a wholesome fear lest the power of the sword wielded by another Maurice or William II should again overthrow the civil power.  The consequence was that when Charles II declared war on March 28, 1672, and Louis on the following April 6, and a great French army of 120,000 men under Conde, Turenne and Luxemburg marched through Liege to invade the States, while another army of 30,000 men from Muenster and Cologne attacked farther north, all was confusion and panic, for it was felt that there was no possibility of effective resistance.  The Bishop of Muenster was eager to take vengeance for his defeat in 1666, and the Elector-Archbishop of Cologne was a Bavarian prince friendly to France.  His help was the more valuable, as he was likewise Bishop of Liege, and thus able to offer to the French armies a free passage through his territory.

Not until the storm was actually bursting on them by sea and land at once were the various authorities in the threatened land induced to move in earnest.  Confronted by the sudden crisis, De Witt however made the most strenuous efforts to meet it.  A fleet of 150 ships was got ready and an army of some 50,000 men, mercenaries of many nationalities, hastily gathered together.  It was a force without cohesion, discipline or competent officers.  In the peril of the country all eyes were turned towards the Prince of Orange.  William was now twenty-one years of age, but by the