active operations.  Ferdinand thereupon, as soon as he saw that there was no immediate danger of an attack from the north, resolved to avenge himself upon the French for the part they had taken in the preceding year’s campaign.  Reinforced by a body of Imperialist troops under Piccolomini he entered France and laid the country waste almost to the gates of Paris.  This bold stroke completely frustrated any plans that the allies may have formed for combined action in the late summer.

The following year the States determined, somewhat against the wishes of Frederick Henry, to send an expedition into Flanders for the capture of Dunkirk.  This was done at the instance of the French ambassador, Charnace, acting on the instructions of Richelieu, who promised the assistance of 5000 French troops and undertook, should the town be taken, to leave it in the possession of the Dutch.  The stadholder accordingly assembled (May 7) an army of 14,000 foot and a considerable body of horse at Rammekens, where a fleet lay ready for their transport to Flanders.  Contrary winds, however, continued steadily to blow for many weeks without affording any opportunity for putting to sea.  At last, wearied out with the long inaction and its attendant sickness the prince (July 20) suddenly broke up his camp and marched upon Breda.  Spinola, after capturing Breda in 1625, had greatly strengthened its defences; and now, with a garrison of 4000 men under a resolute commander, it was held to be secure against any attack.  The siege was a repetition of those of Hertogenbosch and Maestricht.  In vain did the Cardinal Infante with a powerful force try to break through the lines of circumvallation, which the prince had constructed with his usual skill.  Called away by a French invasion on the south, he had to leave Breda to its fate.  The town surrendered on October 10.

During the years 1637 and 1638 the ever-recurring dissensions between the province of Holland and the Generality became acute once more.  The Provincial Estates insisted on their sovereign rights and refused to acknowledge the authority of the States-General to impose taxes upon them.  This opposition of Holland was a great hindrance to the prince in the conduct of the war, and caused him constant anxiety and worry.  It was impossible to plan or to carry out a campaign without adequate provision being made for the payment and maintenance of the military and naval forces, and this depended upon Holland’s contribution.  Amsterdam was the chief offender.  On one occasion a deputation sent to Amsterdam from the States-General was simply flouted.  The burgomaster refused to summon the council together, and the members of the deputation had to return without an audience.  All the prince’s efforts to induce the contumacious city to consider his proposals in a reasonable and patriotic spirit were of no avail; they were rejected insultingly.  In his indignation Frederick Henry is reported to have exclaimed, “I have no greater enemy, but if only I could take Antwerp, it would bring them to their senses.”