men hos logon echon, to de epipeithes logoi]); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name [Greek:  hegemonikon] (Zeller 203 sq.).  Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248, D.F. III. passim).  When the [Greek:  hegemonikon] was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there was vice or emotion.  The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the same country. Virtutis usum:  cf. the description of Aristotle’s finis in D.F. II. 19. Ipsum habitum:  the mere possession.  So Plato, Theaetet. 197 B, uses the word [Greek:  hexis], a use which must be clearly distinguished from the later sense found in the Ethics of Arist.  In this sense virtue is not a [Greek:  hexis], according to the Stoics, but a [Greek:  diathesis] (Stob.  II. 6, 5, Diog.  VII. 89; yet Diog. sometimes speaks of virtue loosely as a [Greek:  hexis], VII. 92, 93; cf.  Zeller 249, with footnotes). Nec virtutem cuiquam adesse ... uteretur:  cf.  Stob.  II. 6, 6 [Greek:  duo gene ton anthropon einai to men ton spoudaion, to de ton phaulon, kai to men ton spoudaion dia pantos tou biou chresthai tais aretais, to de ton phaulon tais kakiais]. Perturbationem:  I am surprised that Halm after the fine note of Wesenberg, printed on p. 324 of the same volume in which Halm’s text of the Acad. appears, should read the plural perturbationes, a conj. of Walker. Perturbationem means emotion in the abstract; perturbationes below, particular emotions.  There is exactly the same transition in T.D. III. 23, 24, IV. 59, 65, V. 43, while perturbatio is used, in the same sense as here, in at least five other passages of the T.D., i.e.  IV. 8, 11, 24, 57, 82. Quasi mortis:  a trans. of Stoic [Greek:  pathesi], which Cic. rejects in D.F. III. 35. Voluit carere sapientem:  emotion being a disturbance of equilibrium in the reason, and perfect reason being virtue (20), it follows that the Stoic sapiens must be emotionless (Zeller 228 sq.).  All emotions are reasonless; [Greek:  hedone] or laetitia for instance is [Greek:  alogos eparsis]. (T.D. Books III. and IV. treat largely of the Stoic view of emotions.) Wesenberg, Em. to the T.D. III. p. 8, says Cic. always uses efferri laetitia but ferri libidine.