words which usually have an opposite meaning.
Now I contend that Cicero’s words
minoris
aestimanda bear quite as strong a negative meaning
as the phrase of Sextus, [Greek: ta me hikanen
axian echonta]. I therefore conclude that Cicero
has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed,
to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the [Greek:
adiaphora], some have [Greek: axia] while others
have [Greek: apaxia]. He may fairly claim
to have applied to his words the rule “
re
intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus”
(
D.F. III. 52). There is quite as good
ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding
the Stoics as there is for accusing Cicero. There
are difficulties connected with the terms [Greek:
hikane axia] and [Greek: hikane apaxia] which
are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources
of information; I regret that my space forbids me
to attempt the elucidation of them. The student
will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on the
passages of the
D.F. quoted in this note.
Non
tam rebus quam vocabulis: Cic. frequently
repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen
the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to prove that
they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at
all.
Inter recte factum atque peccatum:
Stob. speaks II. 6, 6 of [Greek: ta metaxy aretes
kai kakias]. (This does not contradict his words a
little earlier, II. 6, 5, [Greek: aretes de kai
kakias ouden metaxy], which have regard to divisions
of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however,
VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see
R. and P. 393.)
Recte factum = [Greek:
katorthoma],
peccatum = [Greek: hamartema],
officium = [Greek: kathekon] (cf.
R. and P. 388—394, Zeller 238—248,
268—272).
Servata praetermissaque:
MSS. have
et before
servata, which all
edd. since Lamb. eject. Where
et and
que
correspond in Cic., the
que is always an afterthought,
added in oblivion of the
et. With two
nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles, this oblivion
is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with
separate
clauses it is possible. Cf. 43
and
M.D.F. V. 64.
Sec.38. Sed quasdam virtutes: see 20.
This passage requires careful construing: after
quasdam virtutes not the whole phrase in
ratione esse dicerent must be repeated but dicerent
merely, since only the virtutes natura perfectae,
the [Greek: dianoetikai aretai] of Arist., could
be said to belong to the reason, while the virtutes
more perfectae are Aristotle’s [Greek:
ethikai aretai]. Trans. “but spoke of certain
excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the
case might be) by habit.” Ea genera virtutum:
both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of
man into two parts, the intellectual and the emotional,
the former being made to govern, the latter to obey
(cf. T.D. II. 47, and Arist. [Greek: to