prima natura (abl.) could not stand alone, for [Greek:  ta prota te physei] is one of Goerenz’s numerous forgeries.  The ablative is always conditioned by some verb, see Madv.  A comparison of this statement of the ethical finis with that in 19 and the passages quoted in my note there, will show that Cic. drew little distinction between the Stoic [Greek:  ta prota kata physin] and the Peripatetic [Greek:  trilogia].  That this is historically absurd Madvig shows in his Excursus, but he does not sufficiently recognise the fact that Cicero has perfectly correctly reported Antiochus.  At all events, Varro’s report (Aug. De Civ.  Dei XIX. 3) coincides with Cic.’s in every particular.  Even the inexplicabilis perversitas of which Madv. complains (p. 821) is traceable to Antiochus, who, as will be seen from Augustine XIX. 1, 3, included even virtus among the prima naturae.  A little reflection will show that in no other way could Antiochus have maintained the practical identity of the Stoic and Peripatetic views of the finis.  I regret that my space does not allow me to pursue this difficult subject farther.  For the Stoic [Greek:  prota kata physin] see Zeller, chap XI. Ipsa per sese expetenda:  Gk. [Greek:  haireta], which is applied to all things contained within the summum bonum.  As the Stoic finis was [Greek:  arete] only, that alone to them was [Greek:  haireton], their [Greek:  prota kata physin] were not [Greek:  haireta], (cf. D.F. III. 21).  Antiochus’ prima naturae were [Greek:  haireta] to him, cf.  Aug.  XIX. 3, prima illa naturae propter se ipsa existimat expetenda so Stob., II. 6, 7, demonstrates each branch of the [Greek:  trilogia] to be [Greek:  kath’ hauto haireton]. Aut omnia aut maxima:  so frequently in Cic., e.g. D.F. IV. 27, so Stob.  II. 6, 8, [Greek:  ta pleista kai kyriotata]. Ea sunt maxima:  so Stob., Varro in Aug. passim. Sensit:  much misunderstood by edd., here = iudicavit not animadvertit cf. M.D.F. II. 6. Reperiebatur:  for change of constr. cf. D.F. IV. 26 Nec tamen beatissimam:  the question whether [Greek:  arete] was [Greek:  autarkes pros eudaimonian] was one of the most important to the late Greek philosophy.  As to Antiochus, consult M.D.F. V. 67.

Sec.23. Agendi aliquid:  Gk. [Greek:  praxeos], the usual translation, cf.  II. 24, 37. Officii ipsius initium:  [Greek:  tou kathekontos archen], Stob.  II. 6, 7.  This sentence is covertly aimed at the New Academics, whose scepticism, according to the dogmatists, cut away the ground from action and duty, see II. 24. Recti honestique:  these words are redolent of the Stoa. Earum rerum:  Halm thinks something like appetitio has fallen out, susceptio however, above, is quite enough for both clauses; a similar use of it is found in D.F. III. 32.