8) For valetudinem viris pulchritudinem, cf. the [Greek:  hygieia ischys kallos] of Stob. Eth.  II. 6, 7, and T.D. V. 22. Sensus integros [Greek:  euaisthesia] in Stob., cf. also D.F. V. 36 (in sensibus est sua cuiusque virtus). Celeritatem:  so [Greek:  podokeia] in Stob., bene currere in Aug.  XIX. 3. Claritatem in voce:  cf. De Off. I. 133. Impressionem:  al. expressionem.  For the former cf. De Or. III. 185, which will show the meaning to be the distinct marking of each sound; for the latter De Or. III. 41, which will disprove Klotz’s remark “imprimit lingua voces, non exprimit.”  See also De Off. I. 133.  One old ed. has pressionem, which, though not itself Ciceronian, recalls presse loqui, and N.D. II. 149.  Pliny, Panegyric, c. 64, has expressit explanavitque verba; he and Quintilian often so use exprimere.

Sec.20. Ingeniis:  rejected by many (so Halm), but cf. T.D. III. 2, and animis below and in N.D. II. 58. In naturam et mores:  for in ea quae natura et moribus fiunt.  A similar inaccuracy of expression is found in II. 42.  The division is practically Aristotle’s, who severs [Greek:  aretai] into [Greek:  dianoetikai] and [Greek:  ethikai] (Nic.  Eth. I. c. 13, Magna Mor. I. c. 5).  In D.F. V. 38 the [Greek:  dianoetikai] are called non voluntariae, the [Greek:  ethikai] voluntariae. Celeritatem ad discendum et memoriam:  cf. the [Greek:  eumatheia, mneme] of Arist. (who adds [Greek:  anchinoia sophia phronesis]), and the docilitas, memoria of D.F. V. 36. Quasi consuetudinem:  the quasi marks a translation from the Greek, as frequently, here probably of [Greek:  ethismos] (Nic.  Eth. II. c. 1). Partim ratione formabant:  the relation which reason bears to virtue is set forth in Nic.  Eth. VI. c. 2. In quibus:  i.e. in moribus.  All the late schools held that ethics formed the sole ultimate aim of philosophy. Erat:  note the change from oratio obliqua to recta, and cf. the opposite change in II. 40. Progressio:  this, like the whole of the sentence in which it stands, is intensely Stoic.  For the Stoic [Greek:  prokore, prokoptein eis areten], cf. M.D.F. IV. 64, 66, R. and P. 392, sq., Zeller, Stoics 258, 276.  The phrases are sometimes said to be Peripatetic, if so, they must belong only to the late Stoicised Peripateticism of which we find so much in Stobaeus. Perfectio naturae:  cf. esp. De Leg. I. 25.  More Stoic still is the definition of virtue as the perfection of the reason, cf.  II. 26, D.F. IV. 35, V. 38, and Madvig’s note on D.F. II. 88.  Faber quotes Galen De Decr.  Hipp. et Plat. c. 5, [Greek:  he arete teleiotes esti tes hekastou physeos]. Una res optima:  the supremacy of virtue is also asserted by Varro in Aug.  XIX. 3, cf. also D.F. V. 36, 38.