If the existence of a Federal constitution would of itself supply the cause for discontent, it is of the very nature of such a constitution to supply the occasions of dispute.  Nothing can prevent the rise of burning questions about Federal and State rights.  Is nullification or secession, or the refusal to pay Federal taxes a State right?  If these questions arise, by whom are they to be settled?  Suppose they are referred to a Federal Court, say the Privy Council, is it reasonable to fancy that Irishmen or Englishmen, for that matter, will acquiesce in the decision of grave political issues (say the right of the Federal Government to proclaim martial law at Dublin, or the validity of the Land Act) by any tribunal?  For when political issues are referred to the decision of a Court the difficulty is great of enlisting public opinion in favour of its decrees.  The theory of the constitution and the expectation of the people is that references to the judges will be events of rare occurrence, and that the Bench, when it acts at all, will act only as interpreter of the constitutional pact.  Things are certain to turn out far otherwise.  The intervention of the tribunals will in one form or another be constantly evoked, and will be evoked to determine the most burning questions of the day.  The Constitution of the United States would be unintelligible without reference to a long line of determined cases; its principles are to be found quite as much in the decisions of the Supreme Court as in its Articles.  Swiss Constitutionalists have greatly increased as years have gone on the originally limited powers of the Federal tribunal.  The statesmen who drafted the Act constituting the Canadian Dominion fancied they could in effect avoid the necessity for judicial interpretation, but a long series of reports proves the futility of their expectation.  Each day increases the mass, and it must be added the importance, of the judgments by which the Privy Council determines questions of constitutional law for the Colonies.  Moreover, even laymen soon perceive that interpretation means legislation.  It is technically correct to say that the Supreme Court of the United States acts only as interpreter of the Constitution, but we must not be deceived by fictions.  The Supreme Court has legislated as truly, and perhaps more effectively than Congress.  It has achieved, and from the nature of things was compelled to achieve, a feat forbidden to Congress; it has added to or enlarged the Articles of the Constitution.  The good fortune of the United States gave to them in Judge Marshall a profound and statesmanlike lawyer, and the judgments of the great Chief Justice have built up the existing Constitution.  He may be counted, if not among its founders, at any rate as its main architect.  In this instance judicial authority was combined with political wisdom, and Marshall’s opinion was, it is said, rejected by the Court in but two cases, and had it in these instances been followed, would have improved the Constitution.