the moral of that year is that a local Irish army
can, under no circumstances, prove an embarrassment
to the central Government. The general tone,
even more than the precise language of Irish Federalists,
all but forbids the supposition that they are prepared
to secure the supremacy of the Federal Government
by giving it the sole control of the only armed force
which is to exist in any part of the Union. They
probably hope that some sort of compromise may be
found with regard to a matter in which, as theory
and experience alike prove, compromise is all but
impossible. Under certain circumstances, and in
certain cases, and subject to certain conditions,
the use of the armed force throughout Great Britain
and Ireland is, we may suppose, to be left in the hands
of the Federal Executive; under other circumstances,
and under other conditions, the local forces are probably
to be controlled by the local or State Government.
Whether such an arrangement would continue in working
order for a year, is more than doubtful. Assume,
however, that somehow it could be got to work, the
fact still remains that a scheme, intended to secure
local liberty, would certainly ensure Imperial weakness.
The need, moreover, for bestowing some element of strength
on a Federal Executive as a counterpoise to its many
elements of weakness leads almost of necessity to
a result which has scarcely received due notice.
The executive authority must be placed beyond the control
of a representative assembly. Neither in the
United States, nor in Switzerland, nor in the German
Empire, can the Federal administration be displaced
by the vote of an assembly. Federalism is in effect
incompatible with Parliamentary government as practised
in England. The Canadian Ministry, it may be
urged, can be changed at the will of the Dominion
Parliament, and the common Ministry of Austria-Hungary
is responsible to the Delegations. This is true;
but these exceptions are precisely of the class which
prove the rule which they are cited to invalidate.
The Cabinet system of the Dominion is a defect in the
Canadian Constitution, and could not work were not
Canada, by its position as a dependency, under the
guidance of a power beyond the reach of the Dominion
Parliament. What may be the real responsibility
to the Delegations of the common ministry of Austria-Hungary,
admits of a good deal of doubt. No one, who will
not be deceived by words, believes the responsibility
to be at all like the liability of Mr. Gladstone or
Lord Salisbury to be dismissed from office by a vote
of the House of Commons. The Emperor-King is,
as regards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the permanent
and unchangeable head of the State. Turn the United
Kingdom into a Federal State, and Parliamentary Government,
as Englishmen now know it, is at an end. This
may or may not be an evil, but it is a revolution
which ought to give pause to innovators who deem it
a slighter danger to innovate on the Act of Union
than to remodel the procedure of the House of Commons.